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 ABSTRACT 
	  
THE NATURE OF NATURAL 
Sydney E. Scott 
Paul Rozin 
Deborah A. Small 
 
In the modern Western world, consumers prefer natural foods, medicines, and 
personal care products and have a desire to connect with the natural world. Despite 
evident consumer demand for natural products, little research has been devoted to the 
psychological underpinnings of the natural preference.  The present dissertation will 
examine the psychology of the natural preference and its implications in three chapters.  
Chapter 1 will expand the scope of explanations of opposition to genetically modified 
food by applying established theories about naturalness, sacred values and the law of 
contagion. Chapter 2 will examine how inferences about safety and efficacy of natural 
products cause natural to be more strongly preferred when preventing as opposed to 
curing an ailment.  Chapter 3 will explore how naturalness operates as a trustworthiness 
cue and is more strongly preferred in the absence of other trustworthiness cues (e.g., 
brand familiarity).  
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PREFACE 
The research of this dissertation has been conducted in collaboration with Dr. 
Paul Rozin, Dr. Deborah Small and Dr. Yoel Inbar.  Chapter 1 of this thesis has been 
published as Scott, S.E., Inbar, Y., & Rozin, P. (2016). Evidence for absolute moral 
opposition to genetically modified food in the United States. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 11(3), 315-324. I was responsible study design, data collection, 
data analysis, and manuscript composition.  Yoel Inbar assisted with study design, data 
analysis, and manuscript composition. Paul Rozin assisted with study design and 
manuscript composition. Chapter 2 of this thesis was conducted in collaboration with 
Deborah Small and Paul Rozin.  I was responsible study design, data collection, data 
analysis, and manuscript composition. Deborah Small assisted with study design, data 
analysis, and manuscript composition. Paul Rozin assisted with study design and 
manuscript composition. Chapter 3 of this thesis was conducted in collaboration with 
Deborah Small.  I was responsible study design, data collection, data analysis, and 
manuscript composition. Deborah Small assisted with study design, data analysis, and 
manuscript composition.  
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OVERVIEW 
The present dissertation uses a multi-method approach to examine the preference 
for natural and its implications. The preference for natural is prevalent in the Western 
world and influences many everyday consumer judgments and decisions (for further 
discussion, see p. 27 in Chapter 2). The natural preference varies both across individuals 
and across situations. In Chapter 1, I examine individual differences in moral intuitions 
and intuitions about naturalness in the context of attitudes to genetically modified food. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I examine consumers’ inferences about natural products and how 
these inferences cause systematic variation in the natural preference across contexts.   
What Does Natural Mean to the Lay Consumer?  
In order to understand the natural preference, we first must understand what 
natural means to consumers1. Consumers believe naturalness comprises two key 
attributes: lack of extensive human intervention and processing, and lack of additives. In 
free responses, consumers define naturalness as that which lacks human intervention and 
lacks additives (Rozin, Fischler, Shields-Argelès, 2012). In laboratory studies, 
manipulating history of human intervention (Rozin, 2005) and the presence of additives 
(Rozin, 2006) reliably alters perceptions of naturalness.   
Individual Differences in the Natural Preference 
Much of the research that has been devoted to the natural preference examines 
which consumers prefer natural products (e.g., Smith, Huang, & Lin, 2009) and why 
some consumers might always prefer natural products (e.g., Lee, Shimizu, Kniffin, & 
Wansink, 2013; Honkanen, Verplanken, & Olsen, 2006). One reason why some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although there is a clear lay definition of natural, “natural” is not a legally defined and regulated term 
(FDA 2016; Levinovitz 2016). 
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consumers might always prefer natural is that natural products are perceived to be 
morally or ethically superior (Honkanen et al., 2006; Sunstein, 2005).   
One way to understand consumers’ ethical views surrounding naturalness and 
individual differences in those views is to use the framework of “sacred” or “protected” 
values.  Sacred values are defined by the unconditional proscription of certain actions 
(e.g., “Do not kill another human being”) and are backed strong negative emotions 
(Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008; Baron & Ritov, 2009). One potential sacred value 
involves tampering with nature. Indeed, consumers tend to believe that humans should 
not “tamper with the natural world” (Sunstein, 2005) and many sacred value violations 
involve destroying the natural environment (Baron & Spranca, 1997). 
In Chapter 1, I use the theoretical lens of sacred values to contribute to work on 
individual differences in the natural preference. I examine the psychology of moral 
intuitions and intuitions about naturalness with respect to an important policy issue—
attitudes to genetically modified food. If nature is a sacred value for some consumers, 
then the sacred value theoretical framework could provide a new perspective on attitudes 
towards GM food, which are often seen as “unnatural.” Prior research on GM food 
attitudes generally focuses on rational or quasi-rational factors, such as beliefs about GM 
food's risks and benefits, trust in GM food-related institutions, and scientific literacy 
(e.g., Frewer, Scholderer, & Bredahl, 2003; Siegrist, 2000). This approach (which 
implicitly assumes that consumers usually reason about costs and benefits to arrive at 
their attitudes) remains the dominant paradigm in the study of attitudes towards GM food.  
Chapter 1 expands the scope of explanations of opposition to GM by applying established 
theories about sacred values and the natural preference.  I investigate whether opposition 
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to GM food is based in sacred values and emotional intuitions, and whether attitudes to 
the natural world predict anti-GM food attitudes above and beyond cost-benefit analyses.  
Variation in the Natural Preference Across Contexts 
While a great deal of research has been devoted to who might always prefer 
natural products and why, scant research has examined why consumers prefer natural in 
some contexts but not others. Consumers sometimes choose conventional products 
because of pricing (Hughner, McDonagh, Prothero, Shultz, & Stanton, 2007) or because 
the natural preference is weaker in certain product domains (Rozin et al., 2004).  
However, I expect that additional psychological factors drive variation in the natural 
preference across contexts. Chapters 2 and 3 examine inferences people make about 
naturalness and how that causes systematic variation in the natural preference across 
contexts. 
Some prior work has examined the inferences consumers make about natural 
products. This research is often based on theories about halo effects and the affect 
heuristic (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007).  
According to these theories, one positive attribute (naturalness) begets other positive 
evaluations. For example, natural hazards are viewed as having better risks and benefits 
(Siegrist & Sütterlin, 2014); organic cookies are believed to have lower calorie content 
(Lee et al., 2013); and natural perfumes are perceived to smell better (Apaolaza, 
Hartman, López, Barrutia, & Echebarria, 2014).   
The present work expands on this research by taking a different approach. I am 
exploring the nuanced inferences that cause a preference for, or against natural products.  
Sometimes consumers have very robust, positive beliefs (e.g., that natural products are 
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usually safer) and other times consumers have negative beliefs (e.g., that natural products 
are usually less potent). Understanding how inferences vary across attributes allows us to 
predict the contexts in which natural products are most appealing.   
Chapter 2 examines how inferences about safety and potency make natural 
products more appealing in some contexts and less appealing in others. Specifically, I 
investigate whether consumers view natural products as safer, but less potent.  I expect if 
consumers view natural products as safer, but less potent, they will prefer natural 
products more when preventing than curing ailments. When preventing an ailment, I 
predict consumers place more importance on safety and therefore strongly prefer natural 
alternatives; When curing an ailment, consumers place more importance on potency and 
therefore less strongly prefer natural alternatives.   
Chapter 3 examines naturalness as a trustworthiness signal that is most appealing 
when no other trustworthiness signals are available. Trustworthiness entails beliefs about 
reliability, safety, and honesty (Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001). To the extent that both 
naturalness and trustworthiness are related to safety and morality (e.g., honesty), prior 
research suggests that natural products will be viewed as more trustworthy (Li & 
Chapman, 2012; Sunstein, 2005). I propose that consumer beliefs about trustworthiness 
systematically affect when natural products are most appealing.  Specifically, if natural 
products are trustworthy, then they should be most appealing when other trustworthiness 
cues are unavailable. When other cues indicate that a product is trustworthy, naturalness 
as a trustworthiness cue is relatively superfluous.  However, in the absence of other 
trustworthiness cues, natural products should be more strongly preferred because their 
trustworthiness is highly informative.   
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EVIDENCE FOR ABSOLUTE MORAL OPPOSITION TO GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED FOOD IN THE UNITED STATES 
Opposition to genetically modified food is widespread (Frewer et al., 2013; Priest, 
2000), even for crops with great potential to benefit the world’s least well-off. For 
example, vitamin A deficiency is a major health problem in developing countries, but 
genetic modification (GM) opponents have strongly resisted programs to provide 
subsistence farmers in Africa and Asia with genetically modified “golden rice” that 
produces beta-carotene (Harmon, 2013). In the European Union, the use of genetically 
modified organisms in agriculture is subject to extensive restrictions, and six European 
nations have used the so-called “safeguard clause” to bar the cultivation of specific crops 
(European Commission’s Directorate General for Health and Consumers, 2009). Some of 
this opposition is grounded in concerns about unknown ecological or health 
consequences of GM technology. Genetically modified foods have only been in general 
use for about 20 years (Bruening & Lyons, 2000), so a follower of the precautionary 
principle—which holds that an action that might cause harm should not be undertaken 
without near-certainty about its safety—might be opposed to genetically modified food 
on the basis of possible unknown risks (Taleb, Read, Douady, Norman, & Bar-Yam, 
2014). 
Nonetheless, most experts believe that genetically modified crops are no more 
dangerous than conventionally-bred crops. For example, the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) writes that “the World Health Organization, the 
American Medical Association, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the British 
Royal Society, and every other respected organization that has examined the evidence has 
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come to the same conclusion: consuming foods containing ingredients derived from GM 
crops is no riskier than consuming the same foods containing ingredients from crop 
plants modified by conventional plant improvement techniques” (AAAS, 2012). 
Likewise, independent scientific reviews of the environmental risks of GM agriculture 
have not yet uncovered meaningful risks to human health or the natural environment 
above and beyond those of conventional (i.e., non-GM) agriculture (Nicolia, Manzo, 
Veronesi, & Rosellini, 2014; Sanvido, Romeis, & Bigler, 2007).  
The American public, however, does not share this sanguine attitude. Although 
American consumers may be more accepting of GM than Europeans (Gaskell, Bauer, 
Durant, & Allum, 1999; Rozin et al., 2012), opposition in the US is widespread and has 
remained so over time (Hallman, Cuite, & Morin, 2013; Hallman, Hebden, Aquino, 
Cuite, & Lang, 2003). A recent survey of American adults and scientists found that only 
37% of the public thought genetically modified food was safe to eat, whereas 88% of 
AAAS members thought it was (Pew Research Center, 2015). The fifty-one-point gap 
between scientists and the public was the largest of any issue tested, including 
anthropogenic climate change and human evolution. This divergence between scientific 
and public opinion is striking, and has stimulated a great deal of research on public 
acceptance of GM. Much of this research has proceeded from the explicit or implicit 
premise that consumers logically reason about costs and benefits to arrive at their 
attitudes, and thus has focused on rational or quasi-rational factors such as beliefs about 
GM risks and benefits (Siegrist, 2000), trust in GM-related institutions (Frewer, 
Scholderer, & Bredahl, 2003), and scientific literacy (Frewer et al., 2003). A recent meta-
analysis of these studies has identified a set of factors consistently associated with GM 
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opposition, including higher perceived risks than benefits and lower trust in institutions 
(Frewer et al., 2013).  
As productive as this approach has been, it has significant limitations. Beliefs 
about GM risks and benefits may often be the result of pre-existing attitudes toward GM, 
rather than independent determinants of those attitudes (Costa-Font & Mossialos, 2007; 
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Scholderer & Frewer, 2003), and values 
such as moral convictions about nature or technology are important determinants of GM 
attitudes for many (Bredahl, 2001). Indeed, the same meta-analysis of correlates of GM 
opposition identified moral concerns as consistent predictors, particularly in the United 
States (Frewer et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, an approach that focuses primarily on reasoning about risks and 
benefits is difficult to reconcile with how little people seem to know about GM. When 
Americans were given a 4-item quiz of basic true-false questions about biotechnology 
(e.g. “It is possible to transfer animal genes into plants”), the average correct score was 
6.8%, i.e. about 10 points better than chance (Gaskell et al., 1999). And people seem to 
realize how little they know: Fifty-four percent of Americans in a 2013 survey said they 
knew “very little” or “nothing at all” about biotechnology (Hallman et al., 2013). What 
could explain the coexistence of minimal public knowledge about GM (both actual and 
professed) with the widespread belief that genetically modified foods are unsafe and 
undesirable?  
I argue that this combination of minimal knowledge and strong conviction is 
sensible if, for many people, attitudes about GM are the result of absolute moral values 
rather than consequence-based calculations. Psychologists have called these kinds of 
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moral values “sacred” or “protected” values (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tetlock, 2003). 
Their defining characteristic is the unconditional proscription of certain actions (e.g., “Do 
not cause the extinction of a species” or “Do not kill another human being”). Absolute 
moral values are explicitly regarded as axiomatic, requiring no further justification, and 
are protected from trade-offs with non-moral (secular) values—especially money. Many 
people believe, for example, that buying and selling human organs is intrinsically morally 
wrong and should be prohibited regardless of whether organ markets might make people 
better off on average (Roth, 2007). Violations of absolute moral values evoke strong 
emotions, such as anger and disgust (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, 
Lerner, & Green, 2000).  
A separate literature has examined the role of disgust as a cause and consequence 
of perceived moral violations. Violations of moral standards often evoke disgust, 
especially when the value involves food or the body. For example, moral vegetarians are 
disgusted by the idea of eating meat, more so than vegetarians who avoid meat for health 
reasons (Rozin, Markwith, & Stoess, 1997). Furthermore, some behaviors seem to be 
morally proscribed because they are disgusting (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 
2009). When people are asked whether disgusting but putatively harmless behaviors—
such as consensual sex between siblings or a family consuming its deceased pet dog—are 
morally wrong, the answer is typically a quick “yes” (Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt, 
Koller, & Dias, 1993). People are extremely reluctant to abandon this moral 
condemnation even when any harmful consequences (e.g., the siblings might get 
pregnant, dog flesh might make you ill) are explicitly eliminated. Just like sacred or 
protected values, these moral judgments seem to be evidence insensitive—they are based 
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on an absolute proscription of the behavior in question, rather than an evaluation of good 
or bad consequences. Disgust-based proscription seems to occur largely for behaviors 
that violate values pertaining to sex, food, and the body; or that evoke notions of 
unnaturalness, impurity, or contamination (Haidt et al., 1993; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 
2008). Consequently, disgust-based proscription may be especially likely for GM. 
Consistent with this possibility, genetically modified food is often described by 
opponents as unnatural (e.g., “Frankenfood”), as contaminating people by ingestion, and 
as contaminating the natural environment by contact (see McWilliams, 2015). 
In this survey, I examine the roles of disgust and moral absolutism in Americans’ 
attitudes towards genetically modified food. I use measures from the literature on 
“protected values” (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Baron & Leshner, 2000; Ritov & Baron, 
1999; Baron & Ritov, 2009) to answer three main questions: First, how widespread is 
American opposition to GM, and how much of that opposition is absolute moral 
opposition? Second, what role does disgust play—as a cause and/or consequence—in 
moral opposition to GM? Third, what are the consequences of disgust for people’s 
support for GM-related public policies? The most important findings of the survey are 
described below. However, many details of the measures, participants, statistical 
analyses, and extended robustness checks can be found in Appendix A. 
Methods and Results 
Participants 
In June and July of 2013, 1,022 participants representative of the U.S. population 
on age, gender, and income were recruited and paid by Qualtrics.com, an online survey 
hosting and panel recruitment service, to complete the study online (for more information 
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about recruitment, see Appendix A). I specified a minimum sample size of 1,000 
participants based on effect sizes from a pilot study, and I ceased data collection when the 
minimum sample size was reached. I decided a priori to exclude individuals who did not 
pass two attention-check questions2. The final sample was 859 participants (51.7% 
female; Mage = 46.9, SD = 16.5).  
Most GM opposition is “absolute” 
Absolute moral values are defined as injunctions to be upheld regardless of 
consequentialist considerations (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tetlock, 2003). These absolute 
values are universalized, elicit more emotion, and lead to more judgment errors, such as 
the omission bias (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Ritov & Baron, 1999; Baron & Ritov, 2009). 
To assess absolute moral opposition to GM, I asked participants four agree/disagree 
questions (adapted from Baron & Spranca, 1997) about “genetically engineering plants 
and animals.” These were 1) “I do not oppose this”; 2) “This should be prohibited no 
matter how great the benefits and minor the risks from allowing it”; 3) “It is equally 
wrong to allow some of this to happen as to allow twice as much to happen. The amount 
doesn't matter”; and 4) “This would be wrong even in a country where everyone thought 
it was not wrong.”  Participants were classified as “supporters” if they answered “no” to 
question 1. My primary classification of participants as non-absolutist vs. absolutist 
opponents was based on responses to question 2, as agreement with this question is a 
face-valid statement of absolutism. However, my results were not sensitive to this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Participants were excluded if they disagreed with the statement “I would rather eat a piece of fruit than a 
piece of paper or if they rated the scenario “You see a person eating an apple with a knife and fork” as 
moderately, very, or extremely disgusting. Both these questions are included in the Disgust Scale-Revised 
(Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994, modified by Olatunji, Williams, Tolin, & Abramowitz, 2007) to detect 
inattentive responding. 
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specification. Answers to questions 2, 3, and 4 were the same for 80% of participants, 
and using alternate classifications (e.g., based on questions 3 and 4) also yielded very 
similar results to those reported below (full details are available in Appendix A). 
In my primary analyses, participants were classified as supporters if they 
answered “yes” to Q1 and “no” to Q2, as non-absolutist opponents if they answered “no” 
to both questions, and as absolutist opponents if they answered “no” to Q1 and “yes” to 
Q2. (Data from fifty-six individuals with inconsistent responses—i.e., “yes” to both 
questions—were excluded.) Thus, participants were classified as moral absolutists if they 
were opposed to GM and said that they would maintain their opposition regardless of 
consequences. According to this classification scheme, which is based on the one used by 
Baron and Spranca (1997), most participants (515/803; 64%) were opposed to GM, and 
most opposition (366/515; 71%; i.e., 46% of the entire sample) was absolute. 
Moral absolutists are more disgusted by genetically modified food 
I presented participants with four scenarios describing consumption of genetically 
modified foods (tomatoes, apples, tuna, and milk) to assess their affective reactions (see 
Appendix A for the full scenarios). Each scenario had two versions: one where the 
individual intentionally consumed the food, and another where the individual 
unintentionally consumed the food. For example, the tomato scenarios read: “Mary eats 
tomatoes that have been genetically modified. She knows [does not know] the tomatoes 
have been genetically modified. Scientists have inserted genes in them so that they stay 
fresh longer.” For each scenario, participants were randomly assigned to see either the 
intentional or unintentional version.  Immediately after reading each scenario, 
participants were asked to either select a word (“disgust” or “anger”) or a facial 
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expression (a disgusted or angered face, from Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999) that 
best captured their reaction upon imagining the scenario. Finally, all participants were 
asked to rate how disgusted and how angered they were when imagining the scenario (1 = 
Not at all angry/disgusted, 9 = Extremely angry/disgusted). 
My first set of analyses concerned these disgust and anger ratings. I averaged 
disgust ratings (α = .91) across the four scenarios to create composite scores. Moral 
absolutists were most disgusted by scenarios describing genetically modified food 
consumption. The left panel of Figure 1.1 shows composite disgust reactions averaged 
across the four scenarios. Absolutists were more disgusted (M = 5.48, SD = 2.03) than 
non-absolutist GM opponents (M = 4.42, SD = 2.01; t(513) = 5.42, p < .001, d = .53) and 
GM supporters (M = 2.62, SD = 1.76; t(652) = 18.98, p < .001, d = 1.51). 
 Furthermore, moral absolutism was associated with disgust more than anger. I 
averaged anger ratings across the four scenarios to create anger composite scores (α = 
.90). I then conducted a multinomial logistic regression where absolutist opponents were 
the reference category, and entered disgust and anger composites simultaneously as 
predictors. (Both composites were standardized to facilitate interpretation of effect sizes.) 
Both disgust (b* = -.960, Wald χ2 = 17.89, p < .001) and anger (b* = -.815, Wald χ2 = 
12.61, p < .001) distinguished absolutist opponents from supporters, but only disgust (b* 
= -.802, Wald χ2 = 11.01, p = .001) distinguished absolute from non-absolute opposition 
(anger b* = .266, Wald χ2 = 1.25, p > .10).  
This association was robust to controlling for demographics and individual 
differences. In a multinomial regression with absolute moral opposition as the reference 
category, I entered as predictor variables: disgust, two measures of the extent to which 
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people feel close and connected to the natural world (connectedness to nature, Mayer & 
Frantz, 2004; and inclusion of nature in self, Schultz, 2001), perceived risks and benefits 
of GM and trust in GM-related institutions (Siegrist, 2000), gender, age, income, 
religiosity, education, political orientation, and ethnicity (see Table A.2 in the Appendix 
A).  Disgust was the best predictor distinguishing non-absolute opposition and support 
from absolute moral opposition. 
To check robustness to an alternative emotion measure, I examined whether 
participants were more likely to choose disgusted than angry faces after reading each of 
the genetically modified food consumption scenarios. (Recall that half of participants 
chose between facial expressions; the other half chose between the verbal labels “disgust” 
and “anger.”) Ratings of disgust and anger in response to moral violations are almost 
always highly correlated, and consequently researchers generally examine the effect of 
one emotion controlling for the other (e.g., Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Russell & 
Giner-Sorolla 2011a, 2011b). A forced choice between the two is therefore a very 
conservative test of my hypothesis. Nonetheless, participants were more likely to choose 
disgusted faces than angry faces (57.2% for scenario 1, p = .003; 59.1% for scenario 2, p 
< .001; 53.7% for scenario 3, p > .10; 56.3% for scenario 4, p = .01, all binomial sign 
tests two-tailed). This pattern was statistically indistinguishable from the responses of 
those participants who were asked to choose between verbal labels. Furthermore, for two 
of the four scenarios, GM opponents were more likely to choose disgusted faces than GM 
supporters (see Appendix A for the full results). It is therefore unlikely that the current 
results are an artifact of the use of the word “disgust” in English. 
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I also compared scenarios that involved intentional versus unintentional 
consumption (i.e., where consumers ate food knowing versus not knowing it was 
genetically modified). For three of four scenarios disgust was significantly higher for 
unintentional consumption. Although I did not anticipate this result a priori, in retrospect 
I suspect participants were more disgusted by inferred deception on the part of the firms 
selling the food. There were no reliable interactions between the effects of intentionality 
manipulation and level of opposition (i.e., absolutist opponent, non-absolutist opponent, 
supporter) on disgust and anger. Analyses with disgust ratings from only the intentional 
consumption scenarios (that is, the scenarios where someone was described as knowingly 
consuming genetically modified food) were nearly identical to those reported here. 
Further analyses of the intentionality manipulation are available in Appendix A. 
Disgust is specifically associated with GM absolutism 
It is possible that disgust is central to any strong moral aversion, and that the 
relationship between moral absolutism and disgust is simply a specific example of this 
more general phenomenon. To examine this alternative explanation of my results, I also 
asked people the same moral absolutism questions about “fishing in a way that leads to 
the death of dolphins” and classified people as supporters (56/789; 7.1%), non-absolutist 
opponents (165/789; 2.9%), and absolutist opponents (568/789; 72.0%) of this practice. 
(Seventy people were excluded due to inconsistent responses.) Absolute opposition to 
dolphin killing elicited more anger (M = 6.89, SD = 2.19) than disgust (M = 6.62, SD = 
2.28; t(513) = 4.91, p < .001, d = .17). In a multinomial logistic regression with absolutist 
dolphin-killing opponents as the reference category and standardized disgust and anger 
scenario ratings as predictors, disgust (b* = -.444, Wald χ2 = 4.84, p = .028) and anger 
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(b* = -1.006, Wald χ2 = 27.11, p < .001) distinguished absolutist opponents from 
supporters, but only anger (b* = -.444, Wald χ2 = 11.89, p = .001) distinguished 
absolutist from non-absolutist opponents (disgust, b* = -.177, Wald χ2 = 1.827, p > .10).  
Thus, it appears that there are specific features of GM—such as connection with food and 
health, “unnaturalness,” or potential for contamination—that make disgust-based moral 
absolutism especially likely.  
Disgust sensitivity predicts absolute GM opposition 
Thus far, I have shown that moral absolutist GM opponents are more disgusted by 
the consumption of genetically modified food, and that disgust is more predictive of 
moral absolutism than anger. This relationship between disgust and moral absolutism was 
not observed for fishing in a way that kills dolphins, suggesting that disgust is not simply 
a downstream consequence of the perceived violation of any moral value (Pizarro, Inbar, 
& Helion, 2011). Rather, GM absolutism in particular seems to entail disgust. 
Furthermore, the causal arrow likely goes in both directions: if some people think that 
GM is intrinsically disgusting—perhaps because it is seen as “unnatural” and creepy 
(Tenbült, De Vries, Dreezens, & Martijn, 2005) or evokes contamination-related 
imagery—they may be more inclined toward absolute moral opposition. One way to test 
this idea is compare the overall (i.e., domain-general) disgust sensitivity of absolutist and 
non-absolutist GM opponents. If absolute GM opposition results in part from disgust, 
then the disgust-sensitive—those individuals who are especially likely to attend to disgust 
cues and react with disgust to ambiguous cues—should be more inclined to absolute 
opposition.  
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I measured trait disgust sensitivity with the widely used 25-item Disgust Scale-
Revised (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994, modified by Olatunji et al., 2007). As the 
right panel of Figure 1.1 shows, absolutist GM opponents were more disgust sensitive (M 
= 2.33, SD = .65) than were non-absolutist GM opponents (M = 2.11, SD = .68, t(513) = 
3.41, p = .001, d = .33) and GM supporters, (M = 1.88, SD = .64, t(652) = 8.87, p < .001, 
d = .70). Again, this association was robust to controlling for demographics, explicit risk-
benefit assessments, and individual differences (see Table A.3 in Appendix A). 
Disgust predicts support for genetically modified food restrictions  
To measure support for GM restrictions, I assessed support for five different 
regulations restricting genetically modified foods (e.g., “Your government forbidding any 
sale of GM foods within the nation’s borders”). Ratings of the five regulations were 
highly correlated (α = .85) and I therefore averaged them to form a single composite, 
where higher scores indicate greater support for GM restrictions. Support for restrictions 
correlated positively with disgust at genetically modified food consumption (r(857) = .36, 
t = 11.33, p < .001) and with disgust sensitivity (r(857) = .21, t = 6.13, p < .001).  
To investigate whether disgust predicted policy preferences over and above 
explicit beliefs about risks and benefits, I adapted scales created by Siegrist (2000). These 
asked participants to rate the perceived severity of four possible risks of genetically 
modified food (e.g., “genetically modified foods being more toxic or less nutritious, 
harming people who consume them”); the promise of four possible benefits (e.g., 
“genetically modified plants increasing crop yields”); and their trust in five GM-related 
institutions (e.g., “agricultural companies”). A principal components analysis with 
varimax rotation on these items revealed the expected three components (risks, benefits, 
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and trust in institutions), with every item loading most strongly on the expected 
component (see Table A.4 in Appendix A). I therefore created separate composites for 
perceived risks (4 items, α = .91), perceived benefits (4 items, α = .92), and trust in GM-
related institutions (5 items, α = .87).  
I estimated two least-squares regression models that assessed whether averaged 
disgust ratings across the four scenarios (Model 1) and disgust sensitivity (Model 2) 
predicted support for GM restrictions when controlling for explicit assessments of risks, 
benefits, and trust in institutions. Neither model showed substantial multicollinearity (all 
VIFs < 1.3, for zero-order correlations, see Table A.5). Model 1 showed that disgust 
ratings (b* =.12, t = 3.73, p < .001) and perceived risk (b* = .55, t = 18.04, p < .001) 
predicted support for restrictions, but perceived benefits and trust did not (ps > .40 and > 
.70, respectively). Model 2 showed that disgust sensitivity (b* = .06, t = 2.11, p = .035) 
and perceived risk (b* = .58, t = 2.27, p < .001) predicted support for restrictions, but 
perceived benefits and trust did not (ps > .19 and > .40, respectively). I then re-fit each 
model to also include controls for demographic variables and other individual differences 
(political orientation, religiosity, connectedness to nature, and inclusion of nature in self). 
These models are shown in Table 1.1. The only significant demographic predictor was 
age, where older individuals preferred stricter regulations. Disgust and disgust sensitivity 
continued to significantly predict support for restrictions.  
These regression models are conservative in that they assume assessments of GM 
risks are not affected by disgust or disgust sensitivity. This assumption is very likely to be 
wrong, as people are known to rely on their general affective reactions towards a stimulus 
when making judgments about risks (e.g., the “affect heuristic,” Costa-Font & Mossialos, 
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2007; Finucane, Alhakami, et al., 2000). People are especially likely to rely on affect 
when knowledge is low (Ganzach, 2000)—which is, of course, often the case with GM. I 
therefore also tested a path model with disgust sensitivity, disgust at genetically modified 
food consumption, perceived risk, and support for GM restrictions. I allowed a) disgust to 
affect support for restrictions both directly and indirectly via risk judgments; b) disgust 
sensitivity to affect support for restrictions indirectly via disgust and risk judgments. This 
model revealed a significant total (i.e., direct plus indirect) effect of disgust on support 
for restrictions, standardized total effect = .34, as well as a significant indirect effect of 
disgust sensitivity on support for restrictions, standardized total effect = .18. For 
comparison, the direct effect of risk judgments on support for restrictions in this model 
was .55. Full details of the model specification, estimation, and fit statistics are available 
in Appendix A. 
Discussion 
 I draw three main conclusions from the current research. First, I find that a 
majority of the 64% of American participants who oppose GM can be described as moral 
absolutists. These individuals indicate that they would maintain their opposition for any 
balance of risks and benefits; that is, they profess to be evidence insensitive. Second, GM 
opponents, especially absolutist opponents, tend to feel heightened disgust, both 
generally and regarding the consumption of genetically modified foods specifically. 
Finally, disgust and disgust sensitivity predict support for legal restrictions of GM above 
and beyond explicit risk-benefit assessments. 
These results underscore the power of affect to shape beliefs about the 
acceptability of new technologies. Not only are perceptions of risks and benefits often 
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affectively based (Finucane, Alhakami, et al., 2000), but at least in some cases, 
affectively-backed moral values are associated with willingness to disregard risks and 
benefits entirely. This may account for the ineffectiveness of persuasion attempts 
emphasizing benefits and casting doubt on risks of GM (Scholderer & Frewer, 2003). In 
this respect, GM attitudes are similar to those for other novel food technologies—
including insect consumption (Ruby, Rozin, & Chan, 2015) and recycled water (Rozin, 
Haddad, Nemeroff, & Slovic, 2015)—where there are convincible opponents and 
evidence insensitive, absolutist opponents. As in the present case, opponents of recycled 
water are also more disgust sensitive (Rozin et al., 2015).   
A good deal of research has linked disgust to moral violations (e.g., Haidt et al., 
1993; Horberg et al., 2009; Rozin, Lowery, et al., 1999). However, critics of the 
theoretical link between disgust and moral judgment have recently argued that anger, not 
disgust, is the predominant emotion motivating moral condemnation (Royzman, 
Atanasov, Landy, Parks, & Gepty, 2014). This does not seem to be the case here. I find 
that disgust, not anger, predicts absolute moral opposition, supporting the notion that at 
least in some cases moral disgust has downstream consequences on attitudes above and 
beyond anger. Critics of disgust as a moral emotion (e.g., Royzman et al., 2014) also note 
that many prominent examples of “moral disgust” involve some potential pathogen risk 
and/or involvement of body fluids, and that putative moral disgust may simply be non-
moral “basic” or “core” disgust, which is evoked by pathogen vectors such as feces, 
bodily fluids, and spoiled meat. This argument has less force when applied to the current 
study. Although eating is of course a core biological function, it seems unlikely that 
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disgust at someone eating a genetically modified apple is simply core disgust of the kind 
elicited by pathogen threats. 
Taken literally, moral absolutism poses severe problems for governmental and 
institutional policy-making. Moral absolutists by definition have infinite utility for certain 
values; a committed moral absolutist would see the cost-benefit trade-offs that policy-
makers must routinely consider as irrelevant or even offensive (Tetlock et al., 2000). But 
how strongly are absolutist GM opponents committed to their position? The literature on 
protected values, from which I drew the questions I used to assess moral absolutism, can 
help answer this question. This research has found that people who hold a protected value 
do seem to treat that value differently from others. Protected values are universalized, 
elicit more emotion, and lead to more judgment errors, such as the omission bias (Baron 
& Spranca, 1997; Ritov & Baron, 1999; Baron & Ritov, 2009). So there is good reason to 
think that moral absolutists think about GM very differently from other people—a 
contention that is supported by my data. 
However, the research on protected values also shows that people are not always 
as committed to their absolute values as they claim to be (Baron & Leshner, 2000). In the 
case of GM, genetically modified corn and soybeans are present in many packaged and 
prepared foods in the United States, so it is likely that many GM opponents are routinely 
consuming genetically modified food (although they may not be doing so knowingly; 
Hallman et al., 2013). In this respect, GM attitudes may be like many other protected 
values that people claim to hold as absolute but routinely violate in practice (Baron & 
Leshner, 2000). This reasoning suggests that GM absolutism should be flexible at least to 
some degree. In a pilot study (which is described more fully in Appendix A), I 
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investigated whether absolute GM opposition is reduced by exposure to arguments in 
favor of genetically modified food. I recruited 355 Mechanical Turk workers and asked 
them the same four moral absolutism questions described earlier. However, some 
participants were randomly assigned to rate the persuasiveness of ten arguments in favor 
of GM before they answered these questions; the remainder answered the moral 
absolutism questions first and rated the arguments afterwards. These arguments 
concerned different risks and benefits of GM; most importantly for the current results, 
two described large possible benefits for the global poor (preventing blindness by 
preventing Vitamin A deficiency, and helping stop world hunger).  
Surprisingly, I found that the prevalence of absolute moral opposition was not 
reliably affected by whether participants answered the moral absolutism questions before 
rating the arguments (35% morally opposed) or afterwards (29% morally opposed, in 
Yates’ chi-square test χ2(1, N = 337) = 1.09, p = .30). (The somewhat lower prevalence 
of absolute opposition overall, as compared to my representative sample, is most likely 
due to the demographics of Mechanical Turk; for example, respondents were on average 
11 years younger than my representative sample.)  Across all respondents, benefits for 
the global poor and the environment were rated as the most persuasive arguments, but 
moral opponents rated even these below the scale midpoint of 4. It therefore seems that 
absolutist GM opponents reject even strong arguments in favor of genetically modified 
food, and that presenting these arguments does not reliably shift opposition. Although 
this finding is consistent with prior research showing the ineffectiveness of persuasive 
messages in shifting GM attitudes (Scholderer & Frewer, 2003), to some extent it 
conflicts with research showing that people are willing to set aside protected values given 
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a strong enough argument (Baron & Leshner, 2000). This apparent contradiction warrants 
further research. 
Why genetically modified food inspires such high levels of moral absolutism is 
likewise an important topic for future research.  I expect a number of reasons factor into 
absolute opposition to GM. Some may believe agricultural biotechnology companies 
such as Monsanto create and exacerbate economic inequality, which can in itself violate a 
sacred value. However, people oppose genetically modified foods even when they 
directly benefit people in developing countries and are developed by non-profits 
(Harmon, 2013), so anti-corporatism cannot be the whole story. Nor is it likely that GM 
absolutism is the direct result of any other broader political ideology. Unlike other 
disgust-backed social attitudes (e.g., attitudes towards gay marriage; Inbar, Pizarro, & 
Bloom, 2009) attitudes toward GM are not strongly associated with political ideology, 
neither in my data (see Tables 1.1, A.2, A.3, and A.5), nor in other nationally-
representative surveys (Kahan, 2015; Khan, 2013). This may seem surprising given the 
relationship between disgust and socially conservative beliefs (Inbar et al., 2009). 
However, for social conservatives disgust-based moral intuitions seem to result from 
perceived violations of sexual purity, a value that is more important to social 
conservatives than to social liberals (Haidt & Hersh, 2001). In the case of GM, I believe 
that disgust-based moral intuitions are grounded in intuitions about contamination that 
result from perceived violations of “naturalness” (see Rozin, 2005). The current data 
suggest that valuing naturalness is not the exclusive province of the political left or right. 
However, these data and other pilot studies from my lab suggest that left- and right-wing 
people value it for different reasons. I believe those on the left feel more connected to 
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nature, whereas those on the right feel stewardship over the natural world because nature 
is part of God’s creation. If so, liberals may value nature because it is intrinsically part of 
a moral circle and object to any harm of wild animals or habitats.  Conservatives may 
value nature on theological grounds and object to scientists “playing God” (Kass, 2001) 
by disregarding the prescribed relationship between man and the natural world. 
Whatever its ultimate origin, the prevalence of moral absolutism bodes poorly 
for public discourse on genetically modified food. Even a rhetorical commitment to 
absolute moral values makes finding common ground much more difficult. For GM, as 
for other contentious social issues, mitigating moral absolutism may be a first step 
towards resolving long-standing conflicts.
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Table 1.1. Least-squares regression models estimating the relationship between disgust 
and support for GM restrictions.  
Independent 
Variable 
State Disgust Model Trait Disgust Model 
 b b* t p b b* t p 
Disgust .106 .139 3.958 <.001     
Disgust 
Sensitivity 
    .167 .066 1.963 .05 
Perceived Risk .487 .533 15.117 <.001 .526 .576 17.333 <.001 
Perceived 
Benefit 
-.022 -.026 -.836 .403 -.039 -.046 -1.486 .138 
Trust -.031 -.033 -1.056 .291 -.047 -.05 -1.575 .116 
Connectedness 
to Nature 
.388 .121 3.418 .001 .421 .131 3.657 <.001 
Inclusion of 
Nature in Self 
-.08 -.085 -2.539 .011 -.067 -.072 -2.124 .034 
Date of Birth -.012 -.106 -3.427 .001 -.011 -.099 -3.18 .002 
Education .004 .004 .122 .903 -.01 -.009 -.283 .778 
Political 
Orientation (7 
= most 
conservative) 
-.046 -.046 -1.41 .159 -.043 -.043 -1.305 .192 
Income -.041 -.034 -1.061 .289 -.031 -.025 -.779 .436 
Religiosity .046 .03 .971 .332 .049 .032 1.039 .299 
Gender (1 = 
female) 
.025 .007 .228 .82 -.014 -.004 -.119 .905 
Ethnicity, 
White 
-.095 -.017 -.282 .778 -.103 -.019 -.305 .76 
Ethnicity, 
Black 
-.099 -.013 -.265 .791 -.03 -.004 -.079 .937 
Ethnicity, 
Hispanic 
.77 .038 1.253 .211 .789 .039 1.271 .204 
Ethnicity, East 
Asian 
.247 .031 .667 .505 .25 .031 .669 .504 
Ethnicity, 
Native 
American 
.203 .014 .465 .642 .254 .017 .576 .565 
Ethnicity, 
Southeast 
Asian 
-.385 -.025 -.766 .444 -.293 -.019 -.577 .564 
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Note. Two ordinary least squares regression models—one with state disgust in response to 
genetically modified food consumption scenarios (“State Disgust Model”) and one with trait 
disgust sensitivity (“Trait Disgust Model”)—predicting support for regulations restricting the 
production and distribution of genetically modified food for N = 680 participants. Participants 
who selected a political orientation outside of liberal-conservative spectrum (e.g., “don’t know”), 
or who indicated an age outside the range of 18 to 100 years old are excluded. 
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Figure 1.1. Disgust to genetically modified food scenarios and trait disgust for 
supporters, non-absolutists, and absolutists. Reactions to genetically modified food 
consumption scenarios (averaged across four scenarios; left panel) and trait disgust 
sensitivity (DS-R; right panel) for GM supporters, non-absolutist opponents, and 
absolutist opponents are displayed. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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CONSUMERS PREFER “NATURAL” MORE FOR PREVENTATIVES THAN FOR 
CURATIVES 
Consumers often prefer natural versions of many things, including foods, 
medicines, personal care products and home products. Though “natural” is not a legally 
defined and regulated term (FDA, 2016; Levinovitz, 2016), consumers tend to consider 
natural products to be those that don’t have extensive human intervention and processing 
or additives (Rozin et al., 2012). Consumers also widely agree that naturalness is 
preferable. This preference lies at the heart of many consumer trends and public policy 
initiatives. “Natural” was the second-most common claim (after “premium”) made by 
new food and beverage products between 2003 and 2010 (USDA, 2011). Moreover, 
consumers avoid products considered unnatural, such as GMO foods, because of the 
human intervention involved (see Chapter 1; Tenbült et al., 2005). As a result, many 
companies offer GMO-free alternatives (e.g., Chipotle) and some states have passed 
mandatory GMO food labeling laws (e.g., Vermont; Hopkinson, 2016). In the medical 
domain, a growing segment of consumers avoid synthetic medical interventions 
(preferring “nature to take its course”). This trend is evident in the anti-vaccination 
movement, which has led to record-breaking measles and whooping cough outbreaks 
(CDC, 2016; Salzberg 2012, 2015). Finally, there is also a burgeoning natural childbirth 
movement, with many women using midwifes for childbirth and avoiding medical 
interventions like early labor induction, IV antibiotics during labor, and caesarian birth 
(Hamilton, Martin, Osterman, Curtin, & Mathews, 2015; Cruz, 2015).  
Yet even many people devoted to naturalness abandon this preference in certain 
circumstances. For example, most insulin today is genetically engineered, and consumers 
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widely approve of it (Hallman et al., 2002). Similarly, antibiotic treatments are highly 
unnatural. Nonetheless, even for relatively mild ailments like a minor skin infection, most 
consumers accept a synthetic antibiotic treatment.  
Thus, anecdotally, the preference for natural products is not universally pervasive. 
One factor that unites the examples above for which the natural preference looms large 
(e.g., food, vaccination, childbirth) is that they all occur in the absence of illness so the 
health impacts are primarily preventative. These examples highlight a critical variable 
that determines when the natural preference is particularly strong: when a treatment is 
used as a preventative rather than a curative. I provide evidence that the distinction 
between preventing and curing explains variation in the preference for natural across 
broad product categories (e.g., food vs. medicine), within product categories (e.g., within 
medicine: for supplements vs. cold & flu remedies), and for the same product depending 
on how it is used (to prevent or to cure ailments).  Furthermore, I provide evidence for 
the mechanism and boundary conditions based on consumers’ inferences about and 
preferences for safety and potency in their products. 
Inferences about Safety and Potency of Natural Products 
 One way to understand why consumers prefer natural in some situations but not 
others is to consider the inferences they make about natural products, and in particular 
about safety and potency.  Past research suggests that people generally associate 
naturalness with safety (Slovic et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2013; Li & Chapman, 2012). 
Natural things are more familiar and therefore may be lower on the “unknown” 
dimension of risk perception (Sjöberg, 2000; Slovic, 1987). Consumers believe risks that 
are caused by nature (as opposed to man) are less dangerous and they are willing to pay 
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less to reduce nature-caused risks (Kahneman, Ritov, Jacowitz, & Grant, 1993; Rudski, 
Osei, Jacobson, & Lynch, 2011). Indeed, natural products are thought to be safer than 
conventional counterparts even when there is little evidence that this is objectively the 
case (Hughner et al., 2007; Li & Chapman, 2012; Smith-Spangler et al., 2012).  
Prior research on consumer perceptions’ of potency is less straightforward. A 
number of theories—such as halo effects (Asch, 1946; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Thorndike, 1920) and the affect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2007)—emphasize that a liked 
object is inferred to be better on unknown attributes. Consistent with these theoretical 
accounts, objectively equivalent outcomes of natural (vs. human-caused) hazards are 
evaluated more positively (Siegrist & Sütterlin, 2014), organic products are viewed as 
superior on many dimensions due to the halo effect (Lee et al., 2013; Schuldt & Schwarz, 
2010), and alternative medicines are sometimes viewed as better at “treating the cause, 
not just the symptoms” (CDC/NCHS, 2012a; Wang, Keh, & Bolton, 2010). Importantly, 
if this account is correct, natural products should be uniformly judged positively with 
little variation in preferences for the natural alternative across prevent and cure contexts. 
On the other hand, natural products are sometimes marketed as “gentler” 
alternatives (e.g., Johnson & Johnson’s Natural baby products are advertised as “Natural 
Made Gentle”, n.d.). While there is little prior research that directly demonstrates a 
“natural is gentle” inference, there is evidence that ethical and green products are 
perceived to be gentler and less powerful (Luchs, Naylor, Irwin, & Raghunathan, 2010; 
Newman, Gorlin, & Dhar, 2014). Thus it seems plausible that a similar association will 
hold for “natural”.  If so, then natural products might be viewed as safer, but less potent. 
Consistent with this possibility, natural drugs for treating hypertension are perceived to 
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be less effective than their synthetic counterparts (Meier & Lappas, 2016). Together, 
these findings suggest that halo effects around naturalness may not apply when it comes 
to judgments of potency. 
I propose that, although natural products may be viewed as superior on certain 
dimensions, particularly safety, they are viewed as inferior on potency. These nuanced 
beliefs about natural products have important downstream implications. Because 
consumers perceive tradeoffs between safety and potency, they find natural products to 
be more appealing in some contexts than in others. 
Importance of Safety and Potency when Preventing versus Curing 
If consumers infer that natural alternatives are safer but less potent, then they 
should prefer natural alternatives to a greater extent in contexts where safety is more 
important and potency is less important. I suggest that the importance of safety and 
potency depends on whether consumers are preventing or curing an ailment. Specifically, 
I propose that consumers care more about safety when preventing ailments, but once an 
ailment exists they then prefer a more potent remedy even at the expense of safety. 
While these predictions have not explicitly been tested to my knowledge, they are 
consistent with prospect theory, in which risk seeking occurs in the domain of losses 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Specifically, when a consumer is already afflicted (i.e., 
below the reference point and in the loss domain for health), safety becomes less 
important. For example, a consumer afflicted with cancer would become risk seeking and 
thus would prefer a stronger, even if less safe, remedy to try to cure it. However, a 
consumer trying to prevent cancer would be at or above the reference point and thus 
would prefer a safer, albeit less potent remedy. Consistent with this conceptualization, the 
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prospect theory value function has been used to explain why terminally ill patients’—
who are in the loss domain for health—exhibit risk seeking treatment preferences (Rasiel, 
Weinfurt, & Schulman, 2005).  
The Present Research 
I propose that a) natural products are inferred to be safer and less potent, and b) 
consumers will prefer safer, less potent alternatives more when preventing versus curing 
an ailment. Putting these two predictions together, consumers should prefer natural more 
for preventatives than for curatives. Furthermore, the increased preference for natural 
when preventing should be contingent on inferences about risk and potency. If the 
inferences about a natural product’s risks and potency reverse, I predict a reversal of the 
effect. Specifically, when the natural option is the more risky and more potent one (the 
reverse of the usual inference), it will be preferred more for curing than for preventing an 
ailment.  
Beyond anecdotal evidence, the hypothesis that natural is more preferred for 
preventing than for curing is supported by an analysis I performed on a nationally 
representative survey conducted by the Centers for Disease Control/National Center for 
Health Statistics (CDC/NCHS, 2012a; see study B.1 in Appendix B for detailed analysis). 
In this survey, respondents emphasize the importance of naturalness more when trying to 
prevent illness. However, because alternate accounts might exist to explain this 
association in observational data, I focus my analysis on experiments that manipulate 
treatment purpose (prevent vs. cure) to isolate the effect and its mechanism holding all 
else constant. 
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I present a series of studies examining the preference for natural products as a 
function of whether the product is used to prevent or cure an ailment. In a pilot study, I 
examine preferences for natural products across a number of drug/convenience store 
product categories (e.g., vitamins, hair care) and find that the preference for natural is 
predicted by whether the product category is primarily used to prevent or to cure 
problems. Study 2.1 demonstrates the central hypothesis in a controlled test for both 
medicines and household products: natural products are more strongly preferred for 
preventing than for curing an ailment or problem. Studies 2.2-2.4 examine the 
mechanism in different ways. Study 2.2A tests inferences about natural medicines and 
finds that natural medicines are viewed as safer but less potent than synthetic ones. Study 
2.2B tests the effect of treatment purpose on safety and potency preferences and finds 
that consumers prefer safer, less potent medicines when preventing as compared to curing 
ailments. Study 2.3 presents a mediation model of the proposed psychological process: 
the increased preference for natural when preventing versus curing is mediated by 
increased importance of safety relative to potency. Finally, study 2.4 experimentally 
manipulates information about safety and potency of different treatment options and finds 
that this information moderates the key effect.  Specifically, when the natural alternative 
is described as the more potent and more risky alternative (the opposite of the intuitive 
inference), then the effect of treatment purpose reverses: Natural becomes more preferred 
when curing as compared to preventing. Together, these studies provide an organizing 
principle for understanding when the natural preference is strong and when it is not and 
offers a mechanism for this principle.  
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Pilot Study 
 First, I investigate a wide range of common drug and convenience store product 
categories (e.g., hair care, supplements) that contain both natural and synthetic 
alternatives.  I examine whether a category’s primary purpose (prevent vs. cure) predicts 
preference for natural alternatives in that product category.  
Methods   
One hundred twenty-four product categories are listed on Walgreens.com. A 
research assistant blind to the hypotheses reviewed all categories and selected the subset 
of categories that (1) had both natural and synthetic alternatives and (2) were not 
promotional categories.  (An example of a promotional category would be “sale on 
vitamins” which was listed separately from “vitamins” category). For the remaining forty 
categories, the RA generated three examples of items in each category (e.g., hair care: 
shampoo, conditioner, and hair spray). Six categories were excluded because they were 
gender-specific (e.g., feminine care), which left thirty-four product categories.  
Next, two hundred participants on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mage = 36.4, SD = 
11.6, 51.5% female) rated the thirty-four categories on two dimensions in a block design.  
In the purpose block, participants rated all thirty-four products, in a random order, in 
terms of category purpose (prevent vs. cure). In the natural preference block, participants 
rated all thirty-four products, in a random order, in terms of their preference for natural in 
each product category. The order of these two blocks was randomized. For the purpose 
rating, participants rated how the product categories were used from 1 = almost always 
for curing to 5 = almost always for preventing. Through random assignment, half of 
participants saw the reverse response scale order (i.e., 1 = almost always for preventing, 5 
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= almost always for curing). For the natural preference rating, participants rated their 
preference for the natural or synthetic versions of products in that category on a scale 
from 1 = strongly prefer synthetic to 7 = strongly prefer natural, with a midpoint of 4 = 
indifferent.  When each category was presented, the three examples of items in that 
category (e.g., shampoo, conditioner, hair spray) were displayed with the category (e.g., 
hair care).  
 After rating the product categories, all participants completed demographic 
measures (gender, age, income, political orientation, ethnicity, whether they grew up in a 
rural, suburban, or urban neighborhood, religion, and religiosity) and were debriefed.  
Results  
First, I examined whether a category’s primary purpose (prevent vs. cure) predicts 
preference for natural alternatives. The blocked design allows a between-subjects and 
within-subjects analysis. In both analyses, a mean purpose rating (curative to 
preventative) and a mean natural preference rating (prefer synthetic to prefer natural) 
were calculated for each product category. In the between-subjects analysis, ratings were 
calculated using only data from the first block the participants completed (e.g., the 
purpose rating was calculated only using data from participants who completed the 
purpose block first). In the within-subjects analysis, all ratings were used. In both the 
between-subjects and within-subjects analysis, preventative category purpose positively 
correlated with preference for natural alternatives (between: ρ = .42, p = .013; within ρ = 
.30, p = .084; see Figure 2.1). 
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Discussion 
 The pilot study demonstrates that the stated purpose (prevent vs. cure) predicts 
variation in preferences for natural across a wide range of everyday product categories. 
For example, food categories, which were considered more preventative, overall elicited 
a stronger natural preference than medicine categories (see Figure 2.1).  Even within 
particular domains (e.g., medicines), categories that were more preventative elicited 
higher natural preferences (e.g., vitamins, which are largely preventative, had a higher 
natural preference than medicines to treat skin ailments).  However, because this study is 
correlational and many factors may covary with preventative purpose, in the remaining 
studies I examine the effect of prevent versus cure purpose on natural preference in a 
controlled design.   
Study 2.1 
Study 2.1 investigates the central hypothesis, that there will be a stronger 
preference for natural products when preventing than when curing—holding constant 
other aspects of the ailment and product.  
Methods 
One thousand four U.S. participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk completed 
an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation (Mage = 36.4, SD = 12.1, 48.5% 
female).  
Through random assignment, half of participants viewed scenarios about 
preventing problems and half viewed scenarios about curing problems. All participants 
viewed a total of nine scenarios. Three scenarios were about medicines (vitamin B12 for 
vitamin B12 deficiency, vitamin C for vitamin C deficiency/scurvy, and allicin for the 
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common cold) and six scenarios were about household products (anti-mold solution for 
mold, caulk for pipe leaks, mouthwash for mouth bacteria, anti-stain solution for wood 
stains, anti-stain solution for metal stains, anti-stain solution for clothing stains). I 
selected these problems and products because, for each problem, the same product is used 
to prevent and to cure that problem.  
Scenario presentation order was manipulated through random assignment. To 
simplify the task for participants, I separated the medicines and household products in 
two blocks with instructions for each (e.g. before the medicines block in the preventing 
condition, “We are going to ask you to imagine three possible scenarios. In each 
scenario, you are completely healthy and have no symptoms of illness. You are choosing 
a treatment to prevent an illness” and before the household products block in the 
preventing condition, “We are going to ask you to imagine three possible scenarios. In 
each scenario, you are evaluating products used to prevent problems.”) Half of 
participants viewed the three medicine scenarios first (in randomized order) followed by 
the six household product scenarios (in randomized order). The other half of participants 
viewed the six household product scenarios first (in randomized order) followed by the 
three medicine scenarios (in randomized order).  
As an example of a scenario, preventing vitamin B deficiency read as follows 
(with curing version in brackets):  
 
Imagine the following:  
You are currently healthy [ill with hypocobalaminemia, a vitamin B12 deficiency].  
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You have absolutely none of the symptoms of hypocobalaminemia, a vitamin B12 
deficiency (such as fatigue and numbness) [have symptoms of hypocobalaminemia (such 
as fatigue and numbness).] 
You decide to take a treatment, vitamin B12, to prevent [cure] hypocobalaminemia. 
Suppose there are synthetic forms of vitamin B12 (generated in a lab) and natural forms 
of vitamin B12 (extracted from soybean plants). Assume the synthetic and natural forms 
are the same price and you plan to take vitamin B12 once a day for a month. 
 
As in the pilot study, participants indicated preference for natural alternatives on a 
seven-point likert scale for each scenario. After responding to questions about all 
scenarios, participants indicated what the previous scenarios were about (preventing 
illnesses and other problems, curing illnesses and fixing other problems, or don’t 
know/unsure) in a multiple choice manipulation check. For exploratory purposes, 
participants completed the demographic measures from the pilot study and fifteen items 
about general tendencies to prefer natural products (based on Rozin et al., 2004; Schultz, 
2001; for full list of items see Appendix B, study B.4). None of these variables reliably 
moderated the key experimental manipulation, so I do not report analyses including them.  
Results 
 The majority of participants (95.3%) passed the manipulation check. Patterns and 
statistical significance of results are the same when participants who failed the 
manipulation check are excluded. Additionally, order did not interact with treatment 
purpose (prevent versus cure). Therefore, I collapse across order.  
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 In a 2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent, Cure) X 9 (Target Problem: Vitamin B 
Deficiency, Scurvy, Common Cold, House Mold, Mouth Bacteria, Metal Stains, Wood 
Stains, Clothing Stains, Pipe Leaks) mixed ANOVA3, natural options were more strongly 
preferred for preventing than for curing (F(1, 1000) = 35.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .04). In 
addition, natural options were more strongly preferred for certain target problems (F(8, 
995) = 72.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .37) and there was no interaction between treatment purpose 
and target problem (F(8, 995) = 1.65, p = .107). In pairwise comparisons, the natural 
product was significantly more preferred for preventing than for curing in all nine 
scenarios (see Figure 2.2 and Table B.1; across scenarios, effect sizes ranged from d = 
.20 to d = .34; average d = .27). Preventing as compared to curing a problem significantly 
increased natural preference even when only the first scenario presented was examined 
(see Appendix B).  
Discussion 
Study 2.1 demonstrates that consumers prefer natural alternatives more when 
preventing than when curing. In real world contexts, preventing and curing may differ in 
a number of ways. For example, consumers may use curatives targeted toward very 
specific diseases but use preventative treatments for general wellness. Relatedly, 
prevention may involve a more abstract goal (cf. Trope & Liberman, 2003). In study 2.1, 
I control for these potential confounds by varying only whether the product was used to 
prevent or to cure the problem.  
The increased natural preference for preventatives is robust across a number of 
different products and ailments.  It is robust across medical and common household 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I also assessed these effects in two separate mixed ANOVAs—one on medicines and one on household 
products. The direction and significance of effects was the same as the overall ANOVA. 
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problems.  In Appendix B, I report replications of these findings for the medicine 
scenarios (see study B.2A) and the household product scenarios (see study B.2B) using 
fully within-subjects designs. 
Study 2.2 
 In study 2.2, I begin to examine why preventing versus curing alters the strength 
of natural preference. I hypothesize that natural alternatives are viewed as less risky and 
less potent than synthetic alternatives and that less risky, less potent alternatives will be 
more strongly preferred for preventing than for curing. I examine beliefs about natural 
and synthetic alternatives in study 2.2A, and I examine the importance of risk and 
potency in study 2.2B.  
Study 2.2A Methods 
 Two hundred two U.S. participants from Amazon’s mechanical Turk completed 
an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation (Mage = 32.9, SD = 1.4, 33.7% 
female).  
 I predict that natural products will be perceived as safer, but less potent than 
synthetic products.  This pattern should be independent of treatment purpose.  
Nonetheless, I examine beliefs across both preventing and curing contexts as an 
exploratory variable. Based on random assignment, half of participants were told “We are 
interested in your views about prevention of illnesses” and the other half were told “We 
are interested in your views about treatment of illnesses.” Participants rated whether 
natural medicines a) are stronger, b) are more potent, c) are more powerful, d) are riskier, 
e) are more dangerous, and f) have more severe side effects than synthetic medicines. The 
six items were presented in randomized order. Through random assignment, half of 
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participants saw comparisons in one scale order (e.g., “Generally, how strong are natural 
versus synthetic medicines? 1 = natural medicines are much stronger, 4 = natural and 
synthetic medicines are equally strong, 7 = synthetic medicines are much stronger) and 
half of participants saw comparisons in the reverse response scale order (e.g., “Generally, 
how strong are synthetic versus natural medicines? 1 = synthetic medicines are much 
stronger, 4 = synthetic and natural medicines are equally strong, 7 = natural medicines 
are much stronger). Then, participants answered a manipulation check: “Which of the 
following was this study about? (a) Prevention of illnesses, (b) Treatment of illnesses”. 
Finally, participants completed demographic measures (same as pilot study). 
Results 
 The majority of participants (83.2%) passed the manipulation check. Patterns and 
statistical significance of results are the same when participants who failed the 
manipulation check are excluded. I reverse scored one response scale order, so that 
ratings above the midpoint always indicate synthetic medicines are more risky/potent. 
Response scale order did not reliably affect ratings on the six comparison items4 and so I 
collapse across order. Additionally, as expected, thinking about medicines in the context 
of preventing versus curing diseases had no effect on the six comparison items, so I 
collapse across the treatment purpose experimental manipulation.  
 A principal components analysis with a varimax rotation on the six comparison 
ratings yielded a two-factor solution. Accordingly, I averaged a) stronger, b) more potent, 
and c) more powerful into a composite potency score (Cronbach’s α = .89), and I 
averaged a) riskier, b) more dangerous, and c) having more severe side effects into a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Those who saw the risk item in the reverse response scale order rated natural medicines as riskier overall 
(t(200) = 2.19, p = .030). However, since this pattern of results was neither predicted nor found for danger 
and side effects items, I collapse across order. 
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composite risky score (Cronbach’s α = .84). Both composite scores significantly differed 
from the midpoint of four, such that synthetic medicines were perceived as more potent 
and riskier (Mpotency = 5.07, SD = 1.24, t(201) = 12.22, P < .001, d = .86; Mrisky = 4.82, SD 
= 1.25, t(201) = 9.37, P < .001, d = .66).  
Study 2.2B Methods 
Two hundred two U.S. participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk completed 
an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation (Mage = 34.9, SD = 1.7, 45.0% 
female). For this study, in addition to manipulating treatment purpose, I manipulated 
severity to explore whether severity interacts with treatment purpose. For example, 
consumers might always prefer extremely safe medicines for preventing and curing very 
mild ailments, such as a slight cough; In contrast, they might always prefer extremely 
potent medicines for preventing and curing very severe ailments, such as cancer. 
Participants were instructed to imagine scenarios either involving preventing or curing 
diseases that were a) not severe, b) moderately severe, or c) extremely severe. Thus, the 
study consisted of a 2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent, Cure) by 3 (Disease Severity: Low, 
Medium, High) fully within-subjects design. Using a within-subjects manipulation 
increased statistical power to detect any main effects or interactions, though a between-
subjects analysis using only the first scenario yields statistically significant effects in the 
same direction (see Appendix B). Scenarios followed the format (emphasis in original): 
“Your doctor informs you that you [are at risk for/already have] a disease that is [not 
severe/moderately severe/extremely severe].”  
For each scenario, participants responded to four questions on scales ranging from 
1 = not at all, to 7 = extremely. The questions read as follows (emphasis in original).  
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1) To [prevent/cure] this disease, how powerful would you prefer your medicine to be? 
2) To [prevent/cure] this disease, how strong would you prefer your medicine to be? 
3) To [prevent/cure] this disease, how willing would you be to tolerate risks to your 
health as a result of the medicine? 
4) To [prevent/cure] this disease, how willing would you be to tolerate uncomfortable 
side effects of the medicine?  
All scenarios were presented in randomized order, and the four questions were 
randomized for each scenario. Finally, participants completed the same demographic 
measures as in the pilot study.  
Results 
 For each scenario, I first created a composite potency preference measure by 
averaging ratings about preferred strength and power (average r = .87) and a composite 
risk tolerance measure by averaging ratings about risk tolerance and side effects tolerance 
(average r = .76). Then, I conducted a 2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent, Cure) by 3 
(Disease Severity: Low, Medium, High) repeated measures ANOVA on potency 
preference. There were two main effects, such that people preferred more potent 
medicines when curing diseases (F(1, 201) = 35.88, p < .001, ηp2 =.15) and when 
diseases were more severe (F(2, 200) = 309.16, p < .001, ηp2 =.76). The interaction 
between treatment purpose and disease severity was not significant (F(2, 200) = .09, p > 
.25). Similarly, in a 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA on risk tolerance, people tolerated 
more risk/side effects when curing diseases (F(1, 201) = 44.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .18) and 
when diseases were more severe (F(2, 200) = 361.93, p < .001, ηp2 =.78). There was no 
interaction between treatment purpose and disease severity (F(2, 200) = 1.73, p = .18). At 
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every level of disease severity, preventing (versus curing) diseases reduced the preference 
for potency (in paired t-tests, Ps < .001, effect sizes between d = .26 and d = .34; see 
table B.2A in Appendix B) and tolerance of risks (in paired t-tests, all Ps < .01, effect 
sizes between d = .21 and d = .39; see table B.2B in Appendix B).   
Discussion 
Study 2.2 finds that consumers believe natural medicines are less risky and less 
potent (study 2.2A). Moreover, no matter the severity of the ailment, they prefer less 
risky and less potent medicines when preventing versus when curing illnesses (study 
2.2B).  These results imply that one reason why people prefer natural when preventing is 
that the relative importance of potency and safety changes across contexts.  Therefore, 
the next study directly examines whether changes in the relative importance of safety and 
potency mediate the effect of treatment purpose on the preference for natural. 
Study 2.3 
Methods 
Two hundred five U.S. participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk completed 
an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation (Mage = 34.9, SD = 11.7, 41.5% 
female).  
Through random assignment, each participant viewed one scenario that described 
vitamin B deficiency, the common cold, or scurvy. The scenario instructed participants 
consider two cases—one case where they were preventing the ailment and another case 
where they were curing the same ailment. I chose this within-subjects manipulation of 
prevent vs. cure because a within-subjects manipulation provides more power to estimate 
the size of the indirect vs. total effect in a mediation analysis. The scenarios were 
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therefore adapted from study 2.1 for a within-subjects design. (See study B.2A in 
Appendix B for the scenario text.) 
Additionally, all participants indicated the importance of both safety and potency 
when preventing and curing the ailment. Specifically, participants filled out two 
importance measures—one for preventing and one for curing. For each, participants 
specified how important they considered safety and potency of the medicine on a 0 to 100 
constant sum scale. For example, below is the text presented for evaluating the 
importance of potency and safety when preventing the common cold: 
 
Two features of treatments that consumers often care about are potency and safety. We 
are interested in how important these features are to you when you are preventing the 
common cold. 
Potency refers to how strong and powerful the treatment is. 
Safety refers to the degree of risk and the extent of side effects that the treatment might 
entail. 
Please tell us how important each of these are to you personally by allocating 100 points 
between them. For example, if you thought potency and safety were equally important, 
you should allocate 50 points to each. If you thought potency was the only important 
feature and safety was not important at all, you should allocate all 100 points to potency 
and no points to safety. 
In case A, where you are preventing the common cold, how important are safety and 
potency of the treatment? 
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 The survey software required importance of safety and potency to add to 100 
before the participant could move forward. Through random assignment, half of 
participants completed importance questions before preference questions and half 
completed them after preference questions. Furthermore, through random assignment, 
half of participants considered curing before preventing and half considered preventing 
before curing. In addition, participants completed the same trait natural preference 
measures and demographic measures from study 2.1. 
Results 
There were no main effects or interactions with order of questions (all ps > .10) so 
I collapse across order. Additionally, there were no main effects or interactions with the 
type of ailment participants considered, except one main effect where the overall 
preference for a natural medicine (both when preventing and curing) was higher for 
scurvy. Therefore, I collapse across ailments.  
Replicating study 2.1, participants preferred natural medicines more when they 
were preventing an ailment than curing it (MPrevent = 5.52, SD = 1.43, MCure = 5.15, SD = 
1.68, t(204) = 4.09, p < .001, d = .29; See Figure 2.3A). Participants also indicated higher 
importance for safety of the treatment when preventing ailments (MPrevent = 62.6, SD = 
16.8, MCure = 51.0, SD = 19.2, t(204) = 1.66, p < .001, d = .75; See Figure 2.3B). Viewed 
another way, participants indicated lower importance for potency when preventing; 
statistical tests are identical because safety and potency’s importance ratings were 
required to sum to 10. Tables B.3A and B.3B in Appendix B present descriptive statistics 
and t-tests for each scenario independently. 
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In a (within-subjects) mediation analysis, I assessed the indirect effect of 
treatment purpose on preference for natural medicine through relative importance of 
safety versus potency. Because my experimental design was within-subjects, I used 
MEMORE in SPSS (Montoya & Hayes, 2017). MEMORE uses a path-analytic 
framework to estimate indirect and direct effects with bootstrap confidence intervals. 
This analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of the relative importance of safety 
versus potency (indirect effect = .32, 95% CI [.18, .47]). Preventing (versus curing) an 
ailment increased the importance of safety relative to potency (a = 11.63), and increasing 
the importance of safety relative to potency increased the natural preference (b = .035). 
After including relative importance in the model, the effect of treatment purpose became 
non-significant (c = .37, p < .001; c’ = .05, p = .63). Thus, there is evidence for complete 
mediation; the change in preferences for natural when preventing (as opposed to curing) 
is mediated by changes in relative importance of safety versus potency. 
Discussion 
Study 2.3 finds that when preventing (as opposed to curing) consumers place 
relatively more importance on safety and less on potency. This change in relative 
importance mediates the effect of prevention purpose on preference for natural products.   
Though the constant sum measure of attribute importance has the advantage of 
forcing participants to consider tradeoffs between safety and potency, it does not allow us 
to determine whether relative importance shifts because the importance of safety 
increases when preventing, the importance of potency decreases when preventing, or 
some combination of these two effects.  Therefore, I conducted a replication of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Note that the estimate for the a path is much larger than the estimate for the b path because in a the 
outcome variable is on a 0 to 100 scale, and in b, the predictor variable is a 0 to 100 scale and the outcome 
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experiment using absolute measures of safety and potency’s importance (a 7 point likert 
scale for safety’s importance and a 7 point likert scale for potency’s importance).  
Furthermore, I included all scenarios from study 2.1 (including household products) to 
further examine the same mechanism across both medicines and household products. I 
find consistent evidence that the effect of treatment purpose on the natural preference is 
mediated both by an increase in absolute importance of safety and a decrease of absolute 
importance of potency. The details of this additional study are reported in study B.3 in 
Appendix B. 
Study 2.4 
  Studies 2.2 and 2.3 provide evidence consistent with the prediction that natural 
medicines are more strongly preferred when preventing because they are judged to be 
less risky and less potent than synthetic medicines. In study 2.4, I test whether providing 
information that reverses these judgments of risk and potency will reverse when natural is 
more strongly preferred. In other words, when natural medicines are viewed as more 
risky and more potent, then natural medicines should be more preferred in curing 
contexts than in preventing contexts.  
Methods 
One thousand five hundred five U.S. participants from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk completed an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation (Mage = 34.8, 
SD = 11.6, 5.4% female).  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2 (Treatment 
Purpose: Prevent, Cure) X 3 (Attribute Information: Natural More Potent/Risky, 
Unspecified, Natural Less Potent/Risky) between-subjects design. All participants viewed 
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one scenario about an infectious disease with symptoms of fever, fatigue, and diarrhea. 
Half of participants were randomly assigned to consider preventing this disease, and half 
considered curing it.  
In the Unspecified condition, the scenario followed the same format as study 2.1 
where the risk and potency of the medicines were left unspecified. In the Natural More 
Potent/Risky scenarios, the following table of relative risk/potency information was 
appended to each scenario. 
Here is some information on your choices:  
Natural Drug Synthetic Drug 
Stronger Less Strong 
More side effects/more risk 
(e.g., more chance of nausea and allergic 
reactions) 
Fewer side effects/less risk 
(e.g., less chance of nausea and allergic 
reactions) 
  
In the Natural Less Potent/Risky scenario, participants saw the same table but the 
information was reversed for the two drugs: the natural drug was described as less strong 
and with fewer side effects/less risk and the synthetic drug was described as stronger and 
with more side effects/more risk. After reading the scenario, participants indicated 
whether they preferred the natural or synthetic drug on the 7-point likert scale adapted 
from study 2.1.  
 After indicating their preference for the natural versus synthetic drug, participants 
completed three manipulation checks. As a multiple choice manipulation check of 
treatment purpose, participants indicated if the scenario was about preventing a disease, 
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curing a disease, or they didn’t know/were unsure. Then, as a manipulation checks on 
attribute information, participants indicated on two 7-point likert scales the relative 
strength and the relative risk of the natural (versus synthetic) drugs. These scales 
followed the same format as in study 2.2A, where the midpoint of 4 indicated that natural 
and synthetic drugs were equally strong/risky, and higher scores indicated natural drugs 
were stronger/riskier. Finally, participants completed the same trait natural preference 
measures and demographic measures from study 2.1. 
Results 
The majority of participants (96.1%) passed the manipulation check about 
treatment purpose. I examined the manipulation checks of attribute information by using 
one sample t-tests that compare mean ratings of risk and of potency to the midpoint of 
four (which indicated natural and synthetic equally risky/potent). In the Natural More 
Potent/Risky condition, natural medicines were rated as more potent (M = 5.86, S.D. = 
1.53, t(501) = 27.23, p < .001, d = 1.22) and riskier (M = 5.86, S.D. = 1.49, t(501) = 
28.03, p < .001, d = 1.26). In the Unspecified condition, natural medicines were rated as 
equally potent as synthetic medicines (M = 4.00, S.D. = .59, t(496) = .15, p > .25) and 
safer (M = 3.88, S.D. = .66, t(496) = 4.03, p < .001, d = .18). In the Natural Less 
Potent/Risky condition, natural medicines were rated as less potent (M = 1.99, S.D. = 
1.34, t(505) = -33.32, p < .001, d = 1.48) and less risky (M = 1.99, S.D. = 1.15, t(505) = -
39.28, p < .001, d = 1.75).  
In a 2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent, Cure) X 3 (Attribute Information: Natural 
More Potent/Risky, Unspecified, Natural Less Potent/Risky) ANOVA on the preference 
for the natural drug, there was a main effect of treatment purpose such that consumers 
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preferred natural more, on average, when preventing than when curing (F(1, 1499) = 
12.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .01). There was also a main effect of attribute information, such 
that whichever medicine option was described as less potent/less risky was more 
preferred (F(2, 1499) = 10.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .12). As predicted, the main effect of 
treatment purpose was qualified by an interaction between treatment purpose and 
attribute information (F(2, 1499) = 22.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .03). 
Independent sample t-tests comparing prevent and cure conditions at each level of 
attribute information revealed the nature of this interaction (see Figure 2.4). In the 
Unspecified condition, I replicate the effects in study 2.1: the natural alternative is more 
preferred for preventing than for curing (Mprevent = 5.25, S.D. = 1.66, Mcure = 4.89, S.D. = 
1.88, t(495) = 2.32, p = .021, d = .20). Similarly, in the Natural Less Potent/Risky 
condition, natural is more preferred for preventing than for curing (Mprevent = 5.58, S.D. = 
1.66, Mcure = 4.48, S.D. = 1.95, t(504) = 6.80, p < .001, d = .61). However, when natural 
is specified as more risky and more potent, the effect of treatment purpose reverses: 
natural medicines are more preferred for curing than for preventing (Mprevent = 3.40, S.D. 
= 1.90, Mcure = 3.85, S.D. = 1.92, t(500) = 2.60, p = .010, d = -.24).  
The condition for which natural is specified as more risky and more potent 
demonstrates the rare case where the synthetic product is preferred to the natural product. 
When natural products are made to look like synthetic products in terms of their risks and 
potency (in the Natural More Potent/Risky condition), natural products are no longer 
preferred overall (in one-sample t-tests comparing means to midpoint of 4/indifference, 
Mprevent = 3.40, S.D. = 1.90, t(255) = -5.04, p < .001, d = .32; Mcure = 3.85, SD = 1.92, 
t(245) = -1.26, p = .21).  
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Discussion 
In study 2.4, I reverse the key effect when I reverse consumers’ intuitive 
inferences about natural products (making natural more potent and more risky), thereby 
providing further experimental evidence for my proposed psychological mechanism. It is 
worth noting that across my studies, consumers generally prefer the natural alternative 
(albeit less strongly when curing), but in study 2.4 I demonstrate a case for which natural 
products are less preferred. When natural products are specified to be more risky and 
more potent than the synthetic products, consumers tended to prefer synthetic 
alternatives. This could be because safety is generally highest priority—even more so 
than potency—which causes natural to generally be preferred. It could also be that the 
ailments I examined are relatively mundane and that potency would be prioritized over 
safety and thus synthetic medicines would be preferred for more severe ailments (e.g., 
cancer). 
General Discussion 
Consumers widely desire natural products, but not always to the same degree. In 
this article, I demonstrate that the preference for natural is particularly strong when 
consumers are preventing problems or illnesses compared to when they are curing the 
same problems or illnesses. In a pilot study using a variety of common drugstore product 
categories, I find that consumers tend to prefer natural more strongly for categories that 
are primarily used for preventative purposes than for those used for curative purposes.  
Study 2.1 shows that the exact same natural product is more strongly preferred when 
preventing an ailment than when curing it. This effect replicates across many products, 
both for medical and household needs. Study 2.2 shows natural is perceived to be less 
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risky and less potent, and that less risky, less potent alternatives are preferred more for 
preventing. Study 2.3 finds that the increased preference for natural when preventing is 
mediated by increased importance of a treatment’s safety relative to its potency. Study 
2.4 finds that when natural products are described as riskier and more potent than their 
synthetic alternatives, the effect of treatment purpose reverses: natural is more preferred 
for curing than for preventing.  
The natural preference is stronger in some contexts than others. The present 
research helps to explain this. First, it helps to explain variation in preferences for natural 
across broad categories of products, such as why the natural preference is stronger for 
food than for medicine (Gaskell et al., 1999; Rozin et al., 2004). Food is a form of 
preventative health/general wellness and medicines are usually used to cure existing 
ailments. Second, the preventative/curative distinction helps make sense of other puzzling 
preferences, such as variability within product categories.  For example, although 
consumers are fairly accepting of most synthetic medicines, there is widespread concern 
about vaccination. Vaccination involves a synthetic treatment used in a preventative 
context, a context where the natural preference is strong (DiBonaventura & Chapman, 
2008; Lombrozo, 2015).  Finally, the preventative/curative distinction explains variability 
in preferences for the same product depending on whether it is used as a preventative or 
curative. 
In the real world, preventing vs. curing may be confounded with other variables. 
Prevention often involves a more abstract goal (cf. Trope & Liberman, 2003), such as 
overall wellness as opposed to treating a specific illness. Preventatives are often used for 
longer periods of time or in smaller doses than curatives, and doctors might be less likely 
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to prescribe preventatives. In my experiments these other factors are held constant, 
allowing me to more conclusively demonstrate that treatment purpose (i.e., preventing or 
curing) is what is driving the variation in natural preference. 
The pattern of preferences for natural is generally consistent with a prospect 
theory framework (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). When consumers have an existing 
ailment and are curing, they are in the loss domain and therefore risk seeking (lower 
priority on safety vs. potency); when consumers are healthy and preventing, they are at or 
above the reference point and therefore more risk averse (higher priority on safety vs. 
potency). Another theory with some commonalities is regulatory focus (Bullard & 
Manchanda, 2013; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998). Accordingly, a “prevention 
focus” which is “concerned with security, safety and responsibility” naturally maps on to 
preventing an ailment (p. 117, Crowe & Higgins, 1997). However, it is not obvious that a 
promotion focus, which is “concerned with advancement, growth, and accomplishment” 
would map onto curing an ailment (p. 117, Crowe and Higgins 1997). Moreover, if 
regulatory focus were the appropriate framework, then a prevention focus would be 
associated with a stronger preference for natural. I sought to test this empirically.  
Specifically, in study B.4, presented in Appendix B, I examined the relationship between 
natural preference and regulatory focus with 203 participants on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk. The correlation between predominant regulatory focus (higher scores 
corresponding to a predominant promotion focus) and trait natural preference was not 
significant (r = .095, t(201) = 1.35, p = .178). Thus, I don’t find logical or empirical 
support for a regulatory focus account.   
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My findings also dovetail with Rothman and Salovey’s (1997) review on the role 
of framing in medical communication.  They argue that messages emphasizing gains 
(e.g., “If you take this medication, you will prevent disease 95% of the time”) effectively 
motivate people to choose safe options whereas messages emphasizing losses (e.g., “If 
you take this medication, you will get the disease 5% of the time”) motivate people to 
choose risky options. While they do not directly test the difference between preventative 
and curative (which they call “recuperative”) needs, they argue that for both, gain-framed 
messages are most effective at inducing treatment (compared to no treatment) because 
treatment is considered a safer option.  
Although Rothman and Salovey’s article and the present research both involve 
risk preferences when preventing and curing, their context and conceptualization differs 
from mine in a few important ways. First, they examine which message frames are most 
effective at persuading treatment, whereas I examine what type of treatments are selected 
for preventing vs. curing needs. Second, they examine risk preferences as an outcome of 
message frames, whereas I argue and find that people hold different risk preferences 
(absent any message) when preventing vs. curing. Nonetheless, it is interesting that 
Rothman and Salovey treat preventative and curative needs as psychologically similar.  
My findings suggest that there might be more substantial differences.  
Beyond these factors, preventing and curing intrinsically differ in both temporal 
distance and uncertainty. The effects of temporal distance and uncertainty are difficult to 
disentangle. Prevention is about the future, which is inherently uncertain. Indeed, 
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue argue that “it is unclear whether subjects do 
(or can) accept [the assumption that delayed rewards will be delivered with certainty], 
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because delay is ordinarily—and perhaps unavoidably—associated with uncertainty” (p. 
382, 2002). I expect that both temporal distance and uncertainty generate changes in the 
natural preference, and leave the relative importance of these variables as a question for 
future research. 
Finally, I view the preference for natural products as similar to the preference for 
branded products, which are also heuristically believed to be better than generics (Becker 
& Murphy, 1993; Bronnenberg, Dubé, Gentzkow, & Shapiro, 2015). Heuristic thinking 
can distort good decision making if consumers’ beliefs about the potency and risks 
associated with different treatment options are inaccurate. In fact, the inference that 
natural is safer might be grossly misguided in the current regulatory environment. In the 
U.S., natural products are often categorized as “dietary supplements” as opposed to 
“medicines.” Unlike medicines, dietary supplements do not need to demonstrate safety 
and efficacy to the FDA to go to market, and thus may paradoxically be less safe (Bent, 
2008). As a result, marketers might exploit these heuristics (Akerlof & Shiller, 2015) thus 
exacerbating sub-optimal consumer decision making. The degree to which these 
heuristics reduce consumer welfare is a promising direction for future research.
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Figure 2.1. Association between preventative vs. curative category purpose and 
preference for natural in pilot study.  Each data point represents a category whose 
position on the x-axis is the mean of participants’ purpose ratings and position on y-axis 
is mean of participants’ natural preference ratings (starting at 4 = indifferent so that 
product category labels are readable). Between-subjects version is displayed, such that 
only the first block of participants’ ratings are used (e.g., purpose score only calculated 
using participants who rated category purpose first in the survey). 
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Figure 2.2. Preference for natural when preventing versus curing in study 2.1. The 
bolded line of four represents indifference between natural and synthetic alternatives. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the mean.  
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Figure 2.3. Preference for natural and importance of safety vs. potency when preventing 
vs. curing in study 2.3.  The preference for natural increases (panel a) and the relative 
importance of a treatment’s safety vs. potency increases (panel b) when consumers are 
preventing diseases as compared to curing them. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals.  
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Figure 2.4. Preference for natural when preventing vs. curing, depending on information 
about risks and potency of natural treatment in study 2.4.  In study 2.4, preference for 
natural as a function of a) preventing/curing and b) information about risk and potency is 
displayed. The bolded line of four represents indifference between natural and synthetic 
alternatives. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the mean.  
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IN NATURE WE TRUST 
Consumers clearly desire and demand natural products. As described in Chapter 2 
(see p. 27), consumers frequently prefer natural foods and medicines. Yet, despite the 
evident consumer demand for natural products, we know relatively little about the 
psychological underpinnings of the natural preference. Understanding the psychology of 
the natural preference should allow us to build richer theories about these consumer 
preferences and generate predictions about when the natural preference is strong and 
when it is weak.  In this chapter, I argue that naturalness is interpreted as a signal of 
trustworthiness. Therefore, natural products are most appealing when consumers do not 
have other trustworthiness cues to rely on (e.g., when the brands are novel or unfamiliar).  
When other trustworthiness cues are absent, naturalness is impactful because it is a 
particularly informative signal of trustworthiness. 
Trust 
Trust is a multifaceted construct comprised of beliefs about reliability, safety, and 
honesty (Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001; Moorman, Zaltman, & Deshpande, 1992; Morgan 
& Hunt, 1994).  Prior work has examined trust in the contexts of exchange relationships 
and branding. These two streams of research have arrived at similar definitions of trust 
and its components. In research on exchange relationships, trust is typically defined as “a 
willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence.” (p.  315, 
Moorman et al., 1992). Trust perceptions entail two key dimensions: credibility/reliability 
and honesty/benevolence (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994; Kumar, Scheer, & 
Steemkamp, 1995). These two dimensions emerge in factor analyses of survey items 
about trust in buyer-seller relationships (Ganesan, 1994) and researcher-marketer 
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relationships (Kumar et al., 1995).  Similarly in brand relationships, trust has been 
defined as “willingness of the average consumer to rely on the ability of the brand to 
perform its stated function” which involves “beliefs about reliability, safety, and honesty” 
(p. 82, Chaudhuri & Holbrook 2001).  
Trustworthiness is not simply general positivity or quality. For example, brand 
trust is distinct from brand affect (tendency to elicit a positive emotional response) in 
factor analyses of consumer ratings of brands (Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001). Similarly, 
trustworthiness of an endorser differs from attractiveness and expertise in factor analyses 
(Ohanian, 1990). Trusthworthiness confers important advantages, including purchase and 
attitudinal loyalty (Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001; Garbarino & Johnson, 1999; Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994; Sirdeshmukh et al., 2002), favorable treatment from media and regulators 
(Keller, 2003), and successful exchange relationships, particularly in long-term or 
uncertain contexts (Ganesan, 1994; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). 
Natural as Trustworthy 
Prior research has not directly examined the relationship between the natural 
preference and trustworthiness. However, lay inferences about naturalness tend to 
correspond to the definitions of trustworthiness outlined above. In particular, natural is 
viewed as safe and moral, which maps to the dimensions of safety/reliability and 
honesty/benevolence.  
First, natural things are inferred to be high on “safety”/“reliability”, one key 
dimension of trustworthiness.  The inference that natural is safe has been found across 
many contexts (as also discussed in Chapter 2 on pp. 28-29 and demonstrated in study 
2.2B).  Technologies that involve less “tampering with the natural world” are viewed as 
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safer (Sjöberg, 2000). Natural foods (Li & Chapman, 2012) and natural medicines (study 
2.2B; Green, Horne, & Shephard, 2013) are viewed as safer than conventional 
counterparts. Genetically modified foods are viewed as unsafe in part because they are 
unnatural (Siegrist, Hartmann, & Sutterlin, 2016). In fact, the natural-is-safe inference is 
robust enough to persist in the face of evidence that natural and synthetic are equally safe. 
Even when the consequences of natural and man-made hazards are explicitly identical, 
natural hazards and their consequences are viewed as less dangerous and severe (Rudski 
et al., 2011; Siegrist & Sütterlin, 2014).  Similarly, even when natural foods and vitamins 
are chemically identical to synthetic ones, consumers believe that the natural alternatives 
are safer (Li & Chapman, 2012).  
Second, naturalness should evoke inferences of “honesty”/“benevolence,” the 
other key dimension of trustworthiness. Naturalness is a morally laden concept (Sjöberg, 
2000; Sunstein, 2005) and natural things are considered to be morally good and pure 
(Rozin et al., 2004). Two features of moral goodness are honesty and benevolence 
(Landy & Uhlmann, 2017). Therefore, it is likely that natural things are considered both 
honest and benevolent. Indeed, beliefs about safety/healthfulness of natural entities may 
be linked to or the result of more fundamental beliefs that nature is pure and benevolent 
whereas humans are malevolent (Rozin et al., 2004). Thus, naturalness should indicate 
trustworthiness on the honesty/benevolence dimension.  
Substitution Effects 
 Inferences about trustworthiness should systematically affect when natural 
products are most appealing. Trustworthiness is unobservable, but it can be signaled by 
multiple cues.  For example, brand familiarity, reputation, and charitable donation are 
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viewed as trustworthiness signals (Herbst, Finkel, Allan, & Fitzsimmons, 2012; 
Elfenbein, Fisman, & McManus, 2012). I posit naturalness can also signal 
trustworthiness. Moreover, if natural products are trustworthy, then they should be most 
appealing when other trustworthiness cues are unavailable. When other cues indicate that 
a product is trustworthy, naturalness as a trustworthiness cue is relatively superfluous. 
However, in the absence of other trustworthiness cues, natural products should be more 
strongly preferred because their trustworthiness signal is highly informative. 
Some prior work suggests that when consumers try to discern the latent quality of 
trustworthiness, one trustworthiness cue can be less important if other trustworthiness 
cues are already available. A company’s trustworthiness ratings are considered less 
diagnostic if the product category has a low rate of failure (i.e., the product category is 
reliable/trustworthy; Gürhan-Canli & Batra, 2004). “Disclaimer speed” can also operate 
as a trust cue, where slow (vs. fast) disclaimers signal trustworthiness.  Disclaimer speed 
does not impact consumer ratings when a brand is trusted, but does matter when the 
brand is novel or untrustworthy (Herbst et al., 2012).  Finally, charitable donations may 
operate as a trust cue. eBay sellers who donate some proportion of profits to charity get 
increased sales and profits, possibly because they are considered more trustworthy 
sellers.  Donating to charity matters least for sellers with a long reputation history and 
most for sellers with very little reputation history. In other words, the trustworthiness cue 
of charitable giving matters less if another trustworthiness cue (reputation history) is 
available (Elfenbein et al., 2012).  
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Present Research 
I propose that consumer inferences about trustworthiness will systematically 
affect when natural products are most appealing. Specifically, if natural products are 
trustworthy, then they should be most appealing when other trustworthiness cues are 
unavailable. When other cues indicate that a product is trustworthy, naturalness as a 
trustworthiness cue is relatively superfluous. However, in the absence of other 
trustworthiness cues, natural products should be more strongly preferred because their 
trustworthiness is highly informative. I begin to examine this account by investigating 
preference for natural in the presence of a particular trustworthiness cue: brand 
familiarity. I present one study in depth demonstrating that naturalness is most appealing 
when brands are novel. Then I estimate the effect size of brand familiarity on natural 
preference in a meta-analysis of across k = 7 studies and 3,217 participants. 
Study 3.1 
First, I investigate whether that natural preference is stronger for novel brands.  I 
expect that for novel brands, participants rely heavily on naturalness as a trustworthiness 
signal because they do not have other trustworthiness signals (e.g., brand familiarity) to 
rely on. Therefore there should be a stronger natural preference for novel brands.  
Methods 
Four hundred one participants from Amazon’s mechanical Turk completed an 
online survey in exchange for monetary compensation (51.4% female, Mage = 37.2, SD = 
12.4). Through random assignment, half of participants evaluated products from familiar 
brands and half evaluated products from novel brands. All participants evaluated nine 
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pairs of products, where one product was natural and one was synthetic. Figure 3.1 
displays an example of a product pair a participant might evaluate.  
In the familiar brand condition, participants evaluated nine pairs of products from 
nine well-known brands. Specifically, the pairs were: Comet Pure Home Cleaning 
Powder and Comet Original Cleaning Powder; Pledge’s 99% Natural Multi-Surface 
Cleaning Spray and Pledge’s Multi-Surface Cleaning Spray; Dawn’s Pure Essentials Dish 
Soap and Dawn’s Platinum Dish Soap; Febreze’s Free Nature Air Spray and Febreze’s 
Heavy Duty Air Spray; Tide’s Free & Gentle Laundry Detergent and Tide’s Original 
Laundry Detergent; Sierra Mist Natural and Sierra Mist; Pepperidge Farm Baked 
Naturals Crackers and Pepperidge Farm Harvest Wheat Crackers; Lay’s Simply Natural 
Chips and Lay’s Classic Chips; and Smucker’s Natural Red Raspberry Jam and 
Smucker’s Red Raspberry Jam. I selected these products because they represented pairs 
of products from the same (well-known) brand that were roughly equivalent except 
insofar as one was natural.  In the novel brand condition, these same pairs were modified 
so that the brand name and logo were altered (e.g., Sierra Mist became Fresh Pop!).  A 
research assistant blind to the study’s hypotheses altered the images using Adobe 
Photoshop to insert the novel brand names and logos. The order of product pairs was 
randomized. Response scale order was counterbalanced, such that half of participants saw 
natural products on the right side of the screen and a response scale where 1 = strongly 
prefer [synthetic product picture] and 9 = strongly prefer [natural product picture] and 
half of participants saw natural products on the left side of the screen and the reverse 
scale order.   
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After evaluating all nine product pairs, participants completed twelve items about 
their trait natural preference (i.e., their general tendencies to prefer natural products; 
based on Rozin et al. 2004, closely adapted from Chapter 2’s trait natural preference scale 
described in study B.4 in Appendix B).  Finally, participants completed demographic 
measures (gender, age, political orientation) and were debriefed.  
Results 
 Response scale order had no main or interactive effects (all ps > .45).  Therefore, I 
coded responses so that in all cases higher numbers mean stronger preferences for natural 
and collapse across scale order.  
 First, I examined whether consumers preferred natural products more strongly for 
novel brands.  I conducted a 2 (Brand: Familiar, Novel) X 9 (Product Pairs) mixed 
ANOVA on ratings of preferences for the natural alternative. There was a marginal effect 
such that participants preferred natural products for novel vs. familiar brands (F(1, 399) = 
2.70, p = .102, ηp2 = .01).  Additionally, some product pairs elicited stronger preferences 
for natural than others (F(8, 392) = 13.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .22), and there was a significant 
interaction such that novel brands increased the natural preference more for some product 
pairs than for others (F(8, 392) = 2.14, p = .031, ηp2 = .04).  Figure 3.2 displays the effect 
of novel vs. familiar brand on the natural preference for each product pair.  In eight of 
nine pairs, the natural alternative was preferred more strongly for novel brands than for 
familiar brands.  
 Some individuals prefer natural products more across situations.  To control for 
this variability and increase power to detect the effect of brand familiarity, I conducted 
the same analysis of variance including the covariate of trait natural preference (α = .87).  
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In this 2 (Brand: Familiar, Novel) X 9 (Product Pairs) mixed ANCOVA on the natural 
preference, with trait natural preference as a covariate, there was a significantly stronger 
preference for natural for novel vs. familiar brand pairings (F(1, 398) = 7.44, p = .007, 
ηp2 = .02).  Additionally, some product pairings elicited stronger preferences for natural 
than others (F(8, 391) = 13.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .22). Participants with high trait natural 
preference more strongly preferred natural alternatives (F(1, 398) = 209.15, p < .001, ηp2 
= .34).  There was a significant trait natural preference by product pairing interaction 
(F(8, 391) = 2.95, p = .003, ηp2 = .06) and a significant brand familiarity by product 
pairing interaction (F(8, 392) = 2.14, p = .031, ηp2 = .04).   
 Next, I examined whether the effect of novel vs. familiar brand on natural 
preference differed depending how devoted a consumer was generally to consuming 
natural products.  Specifically, I examined whether the trait natural preference moderated 
the effect of our key experimental manipulation. I created a composite score of natural 
preference by averaging across the nine product pairings (α = .82).  Then, I conducted an 
ordinary least squares regression with composite natural preference as the outcome 
variable and brand novelty (familiar = 0, novel = 1), trait natural preference, and their 
interaction as simultaneous predictors. There was a stronger preference for natural if 
brands were novel (b* = .11, p = .007) or if individuals were high on trait natural 
preference (b* = .56, p < .001). However, trait natural preference did not moderate the 
impact of brand novelty (no trait natural preference by brand novelty interaction;           
b* = -.02, p = .59).  In other words, consumers preferred natural more for novel brands 
regardless of their trait tendencies to purchase natural products.  
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Internal Meta-Analysis of Brand Familiarity Studies 
 I conducted seven studies in total examining the impact of brand familiarity on 
the natural preference.  In order to get an accurate estimate of the effect size, I conducted 
a meta-analysis on the file drawer of studies.  
Method 
 I assessed the impact of familiar vs. novel brand on the preference for naturalness 
in k = 7 studies across 3,217 participants. These studies followed a similar format to 
study 3.1 (which is included in this meta-analysis and referred to as “study 6”). 
Participants were recruited on Amazon’s mechanical Turk and completed an online 
survey in exchange for monetary compensation. In all surveys, participants indicated 
their preference for natural vs. synthetic product alternatives. In each survey, through 
random assignment, half of participants considered products from familiar brands and 
half of participants considered products from novel brands. Participants always 
completed the trait natural preference scale and a few demographic measures as in study 
3.1 and were debriefed.  
 Methods differed across studies in a few ways, as summarized in Table 3.1.  First, 
sample size ranged from N = 400 to N = 801. Second, product domain varied across 
studies.  Participants evaluated foods, cleaning products, or both. Third, in four studies, 
each scenario was followed by manipulation checks. Participants indicated which product 
was more natural and how familiar the brand was on a 9-point Likert scales.  Fourth, in 
three studies, I created the unfamiliar brand images using GIMP 2.8 (an open source 
graphics editor), and in three studies, a hypothesis-blind research assistant created the 
unfamiliar brand images.  In one study, no images were used and each scenario only 
	   	  
	   	  
	   69 
involved a verbal description of two products. Finally, in six studies, I examined the 
natural preference on a relative Likert scale, where high scores indicated a preference for 
natural and lower scores indicated preference for synthetic.  In one study, I instead used 
an absolute preference measure, where participants rated the natural and the synthetic 
product separately on overall desirability (1 = not at all desirable, 9 = extremely 
desirable).  In this study, the natural preference was calculated as the difference between 
desirability of natural and desirability of synthetic, where higher scores indicated a 
stronger preference for naturalness. 
Results 
 First, I examined the average effect of novel vs. familiar brand on the natural 
preference across studies. This analysis was conducted using the metafor package in R 
(Viechtbauer, 2010). For each study, I calculated a standardized mean difference by 
calculating the difference in means between the two experimental conditions divided by 
the pooled standard deviation (the Cohen’s d). Positive scores indicated an increased 
natural preference when brands were novel. Because I wanted to allow for the possibility 
that the true effect size differed across studies depending on methodological choices and 
exact stimuli, I used a random effects model.   
 The standardized mean difference across studies significantly differed from zero, 
indicating a small but reliable effect of brand novelty increasing a preference for natural 
(d = .11, 95% CI [.02, .21], Z  = 2.29, p = .022)6.  The forest plot of effect sizes and 
confidence intervals and the overall estimate is displayed in Figure 3.3.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In a fixed effects model, the estimated effect size is very similar: d = .11, 95% CI [.04, .18], Z  = 3.19, p 
= .001. 
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 Next, I assessed the effect of brand familiarity including trait natural preference as 
a potential moderator. For each study, I averaged the natural preference across scenarios 
to create a composite natural preference score. Additionally, I computed a trait natural 
preference score—a regression factor score from a factor analysis on the 12-item trait 
natural preference scale with a one-factor solution. Then, I conducted an ordinary least 
squares regression for each study, with composite natural preference as the outcome 
variable and brand novelty (novel = 1, familiar = 0), trait natural preference, and their 
interaction as simultaneous predictors. The results are displayed in Table 3.2.   
 I conducted a meta-analysis on the regression coefficients in Table 3.2 by 
following the recommendations of Becker and Wu (2007).  A meta-analysis of regression 
coefficients across the six studies revealed a small but reliable effect of brand novelty 
increasing the natural preference (b* = .06, 95% CI [.03, .09]), consistent with the 
standardized mean effect size estimates above.  In addition, there was an effect of trait 
natural preference (b* = .59, 95% CI [.56, .62]), and a small brand novelty by trait natural 
preference interaction (b* = -.03, 95% CI [-.06, -.00]). The results suggest that consumers 
who are very devoted to purchasing natural products may be less influenced by the key 
experimental manipulation (brand familiarity).  However, pragmatically this effect is very 
small and should be replicated in future studies.  
General Discussion 
 I present initial evidence that consumers use naturalness as a trustworthiness cue 
and therefore find natural products most appealing when there are no other 
trustworthiness cues.  I find that when brands are novel (trustworthiness cue absent), 
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natural alternatives are more strongly preferred.  In a meta-analysis across 7 studies and 
3,217 participants, I find this effect is small but reliable (d = .11). 
Implications 
The present research is particularly important as consumers interact in contexts 
where trust is important and difficult to discern, such as online markets (Resnick, 
Zeckhauser, Friedman, and Kuwubara 2000). As consumers go to Amazon, eBay and 
other online sellers, they often interact with strangers and do not necessarily expect 
repeated transactions. In these markets, there are fewer reciprocal relationships and 
dyadic histories between a buyer and a seller. Trustworthiness must be indicated in other 
ways. In these markets, the present research suggests that naturalness will be particularly 
appealing to consumers; Naturalness provides a trustworthiness cue that is otherwise 
absent.  
I will reiterate that, as I argue in Chapter 2 (p. 55), the preference for natural 
products and inferences about natural products are similar to heuristic thinking about 
branded products being better than generics (Becker & Murphy, 1993; Bronnenberg et 
al., 2015) or about “disclaimer speed” signaling untrustworthiness (Herbst et al., 2012).  
This thinking might generally lead to good decisions, but like any other heuristic 
thinking, could also go awry or lead to false inferences.  
Future Directions 
 While these studies provide initial evidence for our proposed account of 
trustworthiness cues, there are many future directions to bolster generalizability and 
internal validity.  One important future step will be to use other trustworthiness cues 
besides brand familiarity.  For example, ratings and reputations could be used to 
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manipulate trustworthiness of brands.  First, this will increase the generalizability of our 
account by extending our effects to cues other than brand familiarity.  Second, it will rule 
out one possible alternative explanation regarding brand extension. It is possible that the 
fit between the particular brands I chose and “naturalness” is poor, which leads to natural 
alternatives for these brands being less preferred (Park, Milberg, & Lawson, 1991).   
 Another future direction would be to directly measure trustworthiness inferences.  
In the present studies, trustworthiness beliefs are inferred from preference ratings.  
Another possibility is to directly measure trustworthiness of natural vs. synthetic 
products.  I expect the difference in trustworthiness will be greater for novel brands than 
for familiar brands.  Additionally, by measuring general positivity or affect 
simultaneously, I could rule out a possible alternative account: that general affective 
reactions, not trust specifically, are changing.  I expect that trustworthiness inferences 
specifically are driving the key effect based on the strong connection between 
trustworthiness and naturalness outlined in the introduction, but my data cannot at present 
rule out this alternative.  
 Finally, an attentive reader might notice a seeming contradiction between the 
findings in this chapter and Chapter 2. In particular, one dimension of trustworthiness is 
reliability, or ability to perform a job. I have argued that natural products are inferred to 
be more reliable (this chapter) but also that they are inferred to be less potent (see Study 
2.2A in Chapter 2). I believe that reliability maps most closely to safety but that (like 
efficacy) reliability sometimes also entails potency. This implies one possible boundary 
condition: If people are primed to think of trustworthiness in terms of potency, and 
underweight the dimensions of safety and benevolence, the interaction between brand 
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familiarity and naturalness should attenuate. In this case, naturalness will not lead to 
strong inferences about trustworthiness in any context and so natural products should be 
equally appealing across contexts.  
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Table 3.1. Summary of methods of novel vs. familiar brand studies. 
Study Sample 
Size 
Product Domain Manipulation 
Check 
Photographs Dependent 
Variable 
1 406 5 pairs of natural 
and unnatural 
cleaning products 
Yes Created by S.S. Relative 
2 403 4 pairs of natural 
and unnatural 
food 
Yes Created by S.S. Relative 
3 801 5 pairs of natural 
and unnatural 
cleaning products 
and 4 pairs of 
natural and 
unnatural food 
No Created by S.S. Relative 
4 400 5 pairs of natural 
and unnatural 
cleaning products 
Yes N/A (No 
Photographs) 
Relative 
5 402 5 pairs of natural 
and unnatural 
cleaning products 
Yes Created by 
hypothesis-blind 
research 
assistant 
Relative 
6  
(i.e., 
study 
3.1) 
401 5 pairs of natural 
and unnatural 
cleaning products 
and 4 pairs of 
natural and 
unnatural food 
No Created by 
hypothesis-blind 
research 
assistant 
Relative 
7 404 5 pairs of natural 
and unnatural 
cleaning products 
and 4 pairs of 
natural and 
unnatural food 
No Created by 
hypothesis-blind 
research 
assistant 
Absolute 
Note. For each study examining the effect of novel vs. familiar brands, study design and 
stimuli details are displayed.   
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Table 3.2. Least squares regressions predicting composite natural preference. 
Study Effect of Brand 
Familiarity  
Effect of Trait 
Natural Preference 
Effect of Brand Familiarity by 
Trait Natural Preference 
Interaction 
1 b = .13, p = .002 b = .58, p < .001 b = -.09, p = .020 
2 b = .11, p = .014 b = .48, p < .001 b = -.06, p = .121 
3 b = .05, p = .059 b = .63, p < .001 b = -.08, p = .003 
4 b = -.01, p >.25 b = .68, p < .001 b = .023, p >.25 
5 b = .03, p > .25 b = .62, p < .001 b = .00, p > .25 
6 b = .11, p = .007 b = .59, p < .001 b = -.02, p > .25 
7 b = .08, p = .069 b = .47, p < .001 b = -.01, p > .25 
Note. Each row displays estimated betas from an ordinary least square regression with 
composite natural preference (averaged across scenarios) as the outcome variable, and 
brand familiarity (dummy variable), trait natural preference, and the interaction between 
brand familiarity and trait natural preference as simultaneous predictors.   
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Figure 3.1. Example stimuli from study 3.1.   
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Figure 3.2. Preference for natural alternative of novel vs. familiar brands in study 3.1. 
The bolded line of five represents indifference between natural and synthetic alternatives. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the mean. † = p < .1, * = p < .05 
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Figure 3.3. Forest plot with standardized mean difference and 95% confidence interval.  
The estimated mean difference from a random effects model across studies is displayed at 
the bottom.     
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the present dissertation, I examined the preference for natural and its 
implications. In Chapter 1, I examined individual differences in moral intuitions about an 
unnatural product—genetically modified food. Many consumers have strong moral 
intuitions that genetically modified food is unacceptable no matter the costs and benefits. 
It is possible these consumers are opposed to genetically modified food they see it as 
tampering with nature. In Chapters 2 and 3, I examined how the preference for natural 
varies across contexts. In Chapter 2, I found that consumers view natural products as 
safer and less potent.  Because consumers place more importance on safety (vs. potency) 
when preventing than when curing, natural products are preferred more strongly for 
preventing than curing.  In Chapter 3, I proposed that consumers view natural as 
trustworthy, and therefore natural products are most appealing when there are no other 
trustworthiness indicators (e.g., when the trustworthiness indicator of a familiar brand is 
absent).  Consistent with this theory, I find that consumers prefer natural more when 
brands are novel than when brands are familiar.  
 Individual differences in the natural preference did not reliably moderate our key 
manipulations in Chapters 2 and 3. In particular, I measured overall individual 
differences in the desire for natural products (i.e., trait natural preference). In Chapter 2, 
consumers’ greater preference for natural products when preventing (vs. curing) was not 
moderated by trait natural preference. In Chapter 3, I found only weak evidence of 
moderation: consumers with high trait natural preference may be less affected by 
manipulations of brand familiarity when choosing natural vs. synthetic alternatives. Even 
if this moderation proves to be replicable, it is quite small in size.  Future research might 
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investigate whether heterogeneity in the effects of other contextual factors on natural 
preference can be predicted by individual differences in intuitions about natural.  
 The present work has expanded our understanding of the appeal of naturalness, 
but future work might examine when and by whom natural products are preferred in other 
cultures. For example, some cultures feel more connected to nature than other cultures 
(see Medin & Bang, 2014). It is also possible that consumers might make different 
inferences about natural products in different cultures, where nature may be viewed as 
more benevolent and safe in some cultures than in others. 
 Throughout this dissertation, one persistent question is whether the average 
consumer is behaving rationally. I have examined lay intuitions and heuristics many 
consumers use to determine the permissibility of tampering with nature (Chapter 1), the 
safety and potency of natural things (Chapter 2), and the trustworthiness, reliability and 
benevolence of natural products (Chapter 3). This question harkens back to debates on 
the rationality of heuristics generally (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1996). Heuristics can be very useful and often accurate, and indeed it might usually be 
correct to view natural as safe, less potent, or trustworthy. However, as with any shortcut, 
sometimes heuristics will lead to inaccurate inferences—sometimes the natural product 
will be unsafe, or more potent, or less trustworthy. The question therefore becomes how 
often consumers are inaccurate, how much these inaccuracies affect their well-being, and 
whether it would make consumers better off to either encourage deeper cognitive 
processing or change lay heuristics and intuitions about natural.   
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 1 
Participants and Demographics 
Sex. Four hundred fifteen participants (48.3%) were male; 444 (51.7%) were 
female. 
Age. Twenty participants who reported ages below 18 or above 100 were 
excluded from analyses with age.  The remaining ages ranged from 18 to 91, with a mean 
of 46.9 (SD = 16.5).  
Race. Seven hundred fifty-eight participants (88.2%) were Caucasian, 49 (5.7%) 
were Black, 7 (.8%) were Hispanic/Latino, 41 (4.8%) were East Asian or Pacific Islander, 
12 (1.4%) were Southeast Asian, and 14 (1.6%) were Native American. Each participant 
was allowed to select more than one ethnicity. 
Sexual orientation. Seven hundred fifty-nine participants (88.4%) described 
themselves as heterosexual; 21 (2.4%) as gay or lesbian; 32 (3.7%) as bisexual. Forty-
seven (5.5%) declined to answer. 
Income. Participants were asked to report their yearly pre-tax household income 
using the ranges less than $25,000 (209; 24.3%); $25,000-$50,000 (233; 27.1%); 
$50,001-$75,000 (164; 19.1%); $75,001-$100,000 (87; 1.1%); and greater than $100,000 
(166; 19.3%). 
Education. I asked participants to report the highest level of education they had 
completed. Fourteen participants (1.6%) did not complete high school; 213 (24.8%) held 
a high school diploma or GED; 75 (8.7%) had completed junior college (associate 
degree) or a technical school; 251 (29.2%) had completed some college; 175 (2.4%) held 
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a bachelor’s degree; 26 (3%) had completed some graduate school; and 105 (12.2%) held 
an advanced degree (either masters or doctorate). 
Religion. One hundred two participants (11.9%) described their religious 
affiliation as atheist/agnostic, 226 (26.3%) as Catholic, 294 (34.2%) as Protestant, 15 
(1.7%) as Judaism, 4 (.5%) as Islam, 6 (.7%) as Hinduism, 8 (.9%) as Buddhism, and 204 
(23.7%) as “Other.” 
Politics. One hundred ninety-nine participants (23.2%) described themselves as 
Republicans, 275 (32%) as Democrats, 225 (26.2%) as independents, and 32 (3.7%) as 
members of another party. One hundred twenty-eight (14.9%) selected “don’t know/no 
preference.” I also asked participants whether they usually thought of themselves as 
“liberal, moderate, conservative, or something else.” One hundred seventy-seven chose 
“don’t know/not political” (112; 13%), “libertarian” (20; 2.3%), or “other” (45; 5.2%). 
The remaining 682 participants placed themselves on a seven-point scale anchored by 
“Very liberal” and “Very conservative.” The mean score (M = 4.08; SD = 1.77) was very 
close to the scale midpoint of 4, labeled “Moderate.” I also asked participants to place 
themselves on the same scale (except that this scale did not contain the “libertarian” 
option) separately for “social issues” (N = 693; M = 3.91; SD = 1.86) and “economic 
issues” (N = 695, M = 4.32, SD = 1.84). 
Location. As a proxy for state of residence, I looked up our participants’ 
locations using their IP addresses (using the geolocation service 
http://www.telize.com/geoip). Twenty-three IP addresses could not be mapped; results 
for the remaining participants are displayed below. 
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Materials and Methods 
Absolute GM Opposition 
I adapted these items from Baron and Spranca (1997).  Participants were asked 
four agree/disagree questions about “genetically engineering plants and animals.” These 
were: 1) “I do not oppose this”; 2) “This should be prohibited no matter how great the 
benefits and minor the risks from allowing it”; 3) “It is equally wrong to allow some of 
this to happen as to allow twice as much to happen. The amount doesn't matter”; and 4) 
“This would be wrong even in a country where everyone thought it was not wrong.”  
Control absolute opposition 
I also asked participants the same four absolute opposition questions regarding 
“fishing in a way that leads to the death of dolphins.” 
GM scenarios 
Participants read four scenarios about people either intentionally or 
unintentionally consuming fictitious genetically modified foods: 
 
1. Mary eats tomatoes that have been genetically modified. She knows [does not know] 
the tomatoes have been genetically modified. Scientists have inserted genes in them so 
that they stay fresh longer. 
2.  Laura is at a restaurant for lunch, and she eats a tuna fish sandwich. She knows [does 
not know] that the tuna she is eating has been genetically modified. Scientists have 
inserted genes in them so that they grow more rapidly. 
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3. Tim knows [does not know] the apples at a local cafe have been genetically modified. 
He purchases and eats an apple from the cafe. Scientists have inserted genes in these 
apples so that they stay crisp longer. 
4.  Amanda knows [does not know] that conventional milk comes from genetically 
modified cows. She purchases a bottle of conventional milk and drinks it. Scientists have 
inserted genes in the cows so that their milk is less likely to induce allergic reactions. 
 
For each scenario, each participant was randomly assigned to read about 
intentional or unintentional consumption. For example, a participant might have read the 
intentional versions of scenarios 1 and 4 and the unintentional versions of scenario 2 and 
3. The effects of intentionality were small and did not substantially affect the main 
results. For further information about intentionality effects, see Appendix A analyses 
below.  
Immediately after reading each scenario, participants were asked about their 
emotional responses to it. I first asked participants to choose whether they felt primarily 
disgusted or angry. Participants did so in one of two ways: Half of participants were 
randomly assigned to always choose between verbal emotion labels; the other half were 
randomly assigned to always choose a face from one of two sets of anger and disgust 
facial expressions (a Caucasian or Indian female; pictures were from Rozin, Lowery, et 
al., 1999). Participants were asked to select the emotion or face that they thought best 
matched their emotion/facial expression upon viewing the situation (for verbal and facial 
expression conditions, respectively). Regardless of whether they chose between words or 
faces, participants were significantly more likely to choose disgust than anger (full 
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analyses of this measure can be found in the supplemental analyses below). 
Subsequently, all participants were asked to report how angry and disgusted they felt 
imagining the situation (on nine-point scales; 1=Not at all angry/disgusted to 
9=Extremely angry/disgusted). The order of these two questions was randomized. 
Control scenarios 
In order to verify that participants were using the emotion response scales as 
intended, I included two control scenarios, one expected to primarily evoke disgust and 
one expected to primarily evoke anger. After reading each scenario, participants 
completed the emotion measures described above. 
 
Control Anger Scenario: Sam is fishing in a way that leads to the death of dolphins. 
Control Disgust Scenario: Josh is a 70 year-old male having sex with a 17 year-old 
female. 
 
GM risks, benefits, trust, and regulation 
I asked participants to rate the severity of four possible risks of genetically 
modified food, the promise of four possible benefits of genetically modified food, their 
trust in five GM-related institutions, and their support for five different regulations 
restricting genetically modified foods, all on nine-point scales. Risk, benefit, and trust 
measures were adapted from Siegrist (2000). 
 
Below are some possible negative consequences of GMO technology. How much risk do 
you think each poses for society? (1=”No risk at all” to 9=”Extreme risk”) 
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1. Genes from genetically modified plants spreading to other plants or 
animals, contaminating the environment 
2. Genetically modified crops giving big corporations too much power over 
small farmers 
3. Genetically modified foods having unknown side-effects, increasing risks 
of cancer or other diseases for people who consume them 
4. Genetically modified foods being more toxic or less nutritious, harming 
people who consume them 
Below are some possible positive consequences of GMO technology. How much benefit 
do you think each promises for society? (1=”Not at consequential” to 9=”Extremely 
consequential”) 
1. Genetically modified plants increasing crop yields 
2. Genetically modified plants requiring less fertilizer and fewer pesticides 
3. Genetically modified foods being more nutritious for consumers 
4. Genetic modification increasing animals' milk or meat production 
In general, how much do you trust the following institutions or persons to deal with GMO 
technology safely and honestly? (1=”Not at all” to 9=”A great deal”) 
1. Food companies  
2. The U.S. government 
3. Science 
4. Scientists and researchers at universities 
5. Agricultural companies 
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In general, do you support the following? (1=”Certainly oppose” to 9=”Certainly 
support”) 
1. Your government requiring companies to label foods that have been 
genetically modified, so that consumers can identify them. 
2. Your government requiring companies to submit every new GM food for 
strict and thorough testing, which can take years to complete. 
3. Your government forbidding imports of GM foods from other countries. 
4. Your government adding extra regulations for companies that produce or 
sell GM foods. 
5. Your government forbidding any sale of GM foods within the nation’s 
borders. 
Disgust Scale-Revised (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Olatunji et al., 2007).  
The 25-item DS-R measures individual differences in the propensity to feel 
disgust. DS scores are stable over time and predict people’s willingness to perform actual 
disgusting actions (Rozin, Haidt, McCauley, Dunlop, & Ashmore, 1999). The DS-R also 
includes two attention-check questions to detect inattentive or random responding. 
Trait Anger 
I assessed trait anger using the Anger subscale of the Aggression Questionnaire 
(Buss & Perry, 1992).  
Inclusion of Nature in Self 
Participants saw a series of seven pairs of circles, which progressed from barely 
touching to almost completely overlapping (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Schultz, 
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2001).  The left circle was labeled “Self” and the right labeled “Nature”, and participants 
were instructed to “select the picture that best describes your relationship with nature.” 
Connectedness to Nature (CNS) 
The CNS is a widely-used measure of the extent to which people feel a 
connection to the natural world (e.g., “I often feel a sense of oneness with the natural 
world around me”). Higher scores on the CNS are strongly associated with 
environmentalist attitudes and behavior (Mayer & Frantz, 2004). 
Demographics 
Demographics included gender, age, income, religiosity, and political orientation. 
Order and randomization 
Half of participants were randomly assigned to first see the six scenarios (four 
genetically modified foods and two control) in random order; then the remaining 
measures. The other half completed the two blocks in the reverse order. Measure order 
was randomized, with each appearing on a separate page except for the risks, benefits, 
trust, and regulation questions (which appeared on the same page), and inclusion of 
nature in self (which was always presented on the last page, with the demographics). For 
all measures except disgust sensitivity and moral opposition, item order was randomized.  
All participants completed the demographics and inclusion of nature in self last, preceded 
by a short unrelated scale assessing lay views of obesity. Item order was randomized for 
all measures except disgust sensitivity and absolute opposition. Effects were consistent 
across order and I therefore collapse across it when reporting the results. 
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Supplemental Analyses 
Alternative operationalizations of absolute opposition 
I define absolute GM opposition using the “should be prohibited no matter how 
great the benefits and minor the risks from allowing it” question described in the 
Materials and Methods above. Descriptive statistics and regression models predicting 
absolute opposition were very similar using the other two questions (i.e., either defining 
absolutism as being quantity insensitive and agreeing to question 3 or as universalizing 
and agreeing to question 4). Using the quantity insensitivity question, 32.6% of 
respondents were supporters, 15.8% were non-absolutist opponents, and 51.6% were 
absolutist GM opponents (out of 764 participants, where ninety-five participants were 
excluded due to inconsistent responses).  Using the universality question, 34.2% were 
supporters, 15.5% were non-absolutist opponents, and 5.3% were absolutist GM 
opponents (out of 783 participants, where seventy-six were excluded due to inconsistent 
responses). 
For the analyses reported in Chapter 1, all significant results remained significant 
and all patterns of means remained the same when using either of the alternate 
classification schemes, with one exception. Using the universalist classification (i.e., 
“No” to question 1 and “Yes” to question 4), the difference between opponents’ and 
supporters’ frequency of choosing a disgust face for scenario 4 was marginal, whereas it 
was significant using the other classification schemes. 
Disgust and absolute opposition 
The relationships between disgust and absolutist opposition were robust to 
controlling for perceived risks and benefits of genetically modified foods, trust in GM-
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related institutions, demographic and individual difference variables.  I conducted two 
multinomial logistic regressions with absolutist opponent as the reference category.  In 
the first regression (Table A.2), average disgust in response to scenarios, perceived risks 
and benefits, trust, demographics, and individual differences were entered simultaneously 
as predictors.  In the second regression (Table A.3), trait disgust sensitivity, perceived 
risks and benefits, trust, demographics, and individual differences were entered 
simultaneously as predictors. In both regressions, all continuous independent variables 
are standardized to facilitate comparison of regression coefficients.  
Principal Components Analysis 
In order to assess whether risk, benefit, and trust are differentiated by our 
participants, I used a principal components analysis with a varimax rotation.  Three 
components emerged using the Kaiser criterion, explaining 75.2% of the variance. 
Below, the loadings of each item are displayed.  
Correlation Matrix 
To further assess whether variables were highly correlated, as might happen if 
predictor variables capture the same underlying latent construct, I examined the zero-
order correlation matrix below.  
Path Model 
I further examined the relationships between disgust at genetically modified food 
consumption, disgust sensitivity, risk perceptions, and policy preferences using path 
modeling. These observed variables were the same unstandardized composite scores used 
in the main text, and in the correlation matrix above. Based on research showing that risk 
perceptions are often affectively based (Finucane, Alhakami, et al., 2000), I specified an 
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indirect path from disgust reactions to genetically modified food consumption via risk 
perceptions. I also specified two paths for disgust sensitivity: one to risk perceptions via 
disgust reactions to GM, and one directly to risk perceptions. The first path reflects my 
expectation that more disgust-sensitive individuals would find genetically modified food 
consumption more disgusting; the second path reflects our expectation that they would 
also find GM aversive, and thus perceive greater risks, for other reasons—for example, 
because they find genetically modified organisms unnatural or contaminating. The 
complete model is shown in Figure A.1. I fit this model to the data using the “sem” 
procedure in Stata 12.0 (Mac OS X) with the default maximum-likelihood estimation 
procedure. The model fit the data well, as shown by a non-significant test for model lack 
of fit, χ2(1) = 1.15, p = .28. Other indices also indicated good overall model fit, RMSEA 
= .013, 95% CI [.00, .093], SRMR = .007, CFI = 1.0. The complete model, with 
standardized and unstandardized parameter estimates (as well as 95% confidence 
intervals for the latter), is shown in Figure A.1. All paths shown are significant at p < 
.001, as are all indirect effects (Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Kline, 2011). 
Demographic and Individual Difference Variables 
 Few demographic and individual difference variables predicted attitudes towards 
or desires to regulate genetically modified food in regression models (see Tables 1.1, A.1, 
A.2).  One exception was attitudes towards the natural world (subjective connectedness to 
nature and inclusion of self in nature).  Those who felt more one with nature were more 
opposed to GM and desired stricter regulations of GM technology, consistent with prior 
work (Siegrist, 1998).  Additionally, older individuals desired stricter regulation of GM 
technology (Table 1.1), though surprisingly they were not more likely to be absolutist 
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opponents to GM technology (Tables A.1, A.2) or view genetically modified food as 
riskier (see Table A.4).  Thus, age appears to be related to more favorable attitudes 
towards regulation specifically.  Finally, gender showed strong bivariate relationships, 
where women were more opposed to GM technology (see Table A.4), consistent with 
prior work (Siegrist, 1998). This relationship does not emerge in full regression models, 
suggesting that women are no longer more opposed after controlling for their heightened 
trait disgust sensitivity and/or risk perceptions. Gender effects were not capturing a 
“white male” effect on risk perception, as I did not find significant gender by white 
ethnicity interactions (Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, & Satterfield, 2000).    
Genetically Modified Food Scenarios: Forced-Choice Results   
For all four genetically modified food consumption scenarios, individuals were 
more disgusted than angered.  Participants were more likely to select a disgust face or 
word in responses (Scenario 1: 56.5% disgust, 43.5% anger; Scenario 2: 59.1% disgust, 
4.9% anger; Scenario 3: 56.2% disgust, 43.8% anger; Scenario 4: 58.6% disgust, 41.4% 
anger; all binomial test ps < .001). Participants were about equally likely to select disgust 
when selecting faces as when selecting words (Scenario 1: face disgust = 57.2%, word 
disgust = 55.7%, χ2(1) = .20, p > .10; Scenario 2: face disgust = 59.1%, word disgust = 
59.2%, χ2(1) = .00, p > .10; Scenario 3: face disgust = 53.7%, word disgust = 58.7%, 
χ2(1) = 2.20, p > .10; Scenario 4: face disgust = 56.3%, word disgust = 6.8%, χ2(1) = 
1.84, p > .10).  When choosing between disgust and anger faces, GM opponents were 
more likely than supporters to choose disgust faces in two out of four scenarios (Scenario 
1: 54.1% supporters choose disgust, 59.8% opponents choose disgust, χ2(1) = 1.21, p > 
.10; Scenario 2: 5.7% supporters choose disgust, 64.1% opponents choose disgust, χ2(1) = 
	  
	   93 
6.92, p = .009; Scenario 3: 54.1% supporters choose disgust, 52.2% opponents choose 
disgust, χ2(1) = .14, p > .10; Scenario 4: 49.3% supporters choose disgust, 61.0% 
opponents choose disgust, χ2(1) = 5.09, p = .024). 
Genetically Modified Food Scenarios: Intentionality Manipulation 
For each of the four genetically modified food scenarios, I randomly varied 
whether the food was consumed intentionally or unintentionally (i.e., with or without 
knowing the food was genetically modified; see full scenarios above). I examined the 
effects of intentions, emotion types, and opposition type in 2 (Intention: Intentional, 
Unintentional) x 2 (Emotion: Disgust, Anger) x 3 (Opposition: Absolutist Opponent, 
Non-absolutist Opponent, Supporter) mixed ANOVAs for each scenario.  Overall, 
unintentional consumption evoked stronger emotion ratings, and this was especially the 
case for anger (Scenario 1: emotion: F(1, 797) = 5.04, p = .025, ηp2 = .01, intention: F(1, 
797) = 24.73, p < .001, ηp2 =.03, opposition: F(2, 797) = 148.24, p < .001, ηp2 =.27; 
emotion-intention interaction: F(1, 797) = 6.21, p = .013, ηp2 = .01; emotion-opposition 
interaction: F(2, 797) = 2.59, p = .075, ηp2 =.01; intention-opposition interaction: F(2, 797) 
= 2.20, p > .10; intention-emotion-opposition interaction: F(2, 797) = 1.05, p > .10; 
Scenario 2: emotion: F(1, 797) = 2.69, p = .101, ηp2 = .00, intention: F(1, 797) = 1.03, p 
= .002, ηp2 = .01, opposition: F(2, 797) = 155.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .28; emotion-intention 
interaction: F(1, 797) = 12.88, p < .001, ηp2 =.02; emotion-opposition interaction: F(2, 
797) = 1.60, p > .10; intention-opposition interaction: F(2, 797) = .37, p > .10; intention-
emotion-opposition interaction: F(2, 797) = .14, p > .10; Scenario 3: emotion: F(1, 797) = 
1.41, p = .001, ηp2 =.01, intention: F(1, 797) = 13.38, p < .001, ηp2 =.02, opposition: F(2, 
797) = 133.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .25; emotion-intention interaction: F(1, 797) = 15.79, p 
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< .001, ηp2 = .02; emotion-opposition interaction: F(2, 797) = 1.64, p > .10; intention-
opposition interaction: F(2, 797) = 1.47, p > .10; intention-emotion-opposition interaction: 
F(2, 797) = .73, p > .10; Scenario 4: emotion: F(1, 797) = 1.59, p = .001, ηp2 = .01, 
intention: F(1, 797) = 8.56, p = .004, ηp2 = .01, opposition: F(2, 797) = 135.46, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .25; emotion-intention interaction: F(1, 797) = 7.87, p = .005, ηp2 = .01; emotion-
opposition interaction: F(2, 797) = .23, p > .10; intention-opposition interaction: F(2, 797) 
= 1.05, p > .10; intention-emotion-opposition interaction: F(2, 797) = .70, p > .10). 
In that anger was more responsive to intentions, these findings are consistent with 
prior work on moral anger and disgust (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a). I did not expect 
moral emotions to increase for unintentional consumption, but in retrospect I believe that 
this emotional reaction may have been directed towards genetically modified food 
producers, as opposed to unaware consumers.  Indeed, a recent survey of a large sample 
of Americans revealed that 63% would be upset if they were served genetically modified 
food at a restaurant without knowing the food was genetically modified (Hallman et al., 
2013).  Consistent with this interpretation, disgust is not a reliably dominant response for 
unintentional consumption.  For unintentional consumption scenarios, rated disgust and 
anger did not significantly differ (Scenario 1: Manger = 4.36, SD = 2.61, Mdisgust = 4.43, SD 
= 2.57, t(435) = .98, p > .10; Scenario 2: Manger = 4.98, SD = 2.71, Mdisgust = 4.90, SD = 
2.70, t(429) = 1.15, p > .10; Scenario 3: Manger = 4.33, SD = 2.60, Mdisgust = 4.36, SD = 
2.57, t(439) = .37, p > .10; Scenario 4: Manger = 4.34, SD = 2.58, Mdisgust = 4.42, SD = 2.60, 
t(413) = 1.14, p > .10).  If anything, these results indicate that including unintentional 
consumption generates bias against finding a unique association between disgust and GM 
opposition.  
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I also repeated analyses reported in the main text only using intentional 
consumption scenarios. All significant results remained significant and all patterns of 
means remained the same as those reported with two exceptions, both related to 
likelihood of selecting disgusted facial expression or verbal label. 1) Participants still 
choose disgusted more than angered faces in two of four scenarios, though it was a 
different two scenarios that showed significant effects; 2) There was some indication that 
the likelihood of disgust more often was higher when choosing between verbal labels as 
opposed to facial expressions.  A chi square test of verbal/facial manipulation by 
disgust/anger choice was significant in one scenario and marginal in another. 
Genetically Modified Food Scenarios: Disgust to GM of Animals Versus Plants 
Scenarios involving genetically modified animal products were on average rated 
more disgusting than scenarios involving genetically modified plant products.  The 
relationship between increased disgust and absolute opposition was about equally strong 
for plant and animal modification scenarios.  In a mixed ANOVA of the effect of 
opposition status (absolutist opponent, non-absolutist opponent, supporter) on average 
Likert scale disgust rating for the plant product scenarios and average Likert scale disgust 
rating for the animal product scenarios, level of opposition affected disgust ratings (F(2, 
800) =177.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .31), animal product scenarios increased disgust ratings 
(F(1, 800) = 45.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .05), and the effect of opposition status did not differ 
for animal versus plant products (F(2, 800) = 2.21, p > .10).  
Control Scenario Analyses 
As I expected, after reading the dolphin-killing scenario more individuals selected 
an anger face or word (8.9% anger versus 19.1% disgust, p < .001) and individuals 
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indicated more anger than disgust in Likert responses (Manger = 6.89, SD = 2.19, Mdisgust = 
6.62, SD = 2.28, t(858) = 4.91, p < .001, d = .17).  After reading the sex scenario, more 
individuals selected a disgust face or word (67.1% disgust versus 32.9% anger, p < .001) 
and individuals indicated more disgust than anger in Likert responses (Mdisgust = 7.29, SD 
= 2.38, Manger = 6.40, SD = 2.79, t(858) = 13.88, p < .001, d = .49). 
Trait anger 
I expected trait anger to predict absolute opposition of dolphin killing, as state 
anger does.  However, in a multinomial logistic regression with “absolutist opponent” as 
reference category, standardized trait anger did not predict levels of non-absolute 
opposition (b* = .067, Wald χ2 = .57, p > .10) or support (b* = -.073, Wald χ2 = .26, p > 
.10). For absolute GM opposition, in a multinomial logistic regression with “absolutist 
opponent” as reference category, lower standardized trait anger did not predict levels of 
non-absolutist opposition (b* = .000, Wald χ2 = .00, p > .10), though it was associated 
with lower likelihood of being a GM supporter (b* = -.248, Wald χ2 = 8.94, p = .003). 
Trait anger was uncorrelated with desire to regulate GM foods (r(857) = .012, p = .725). 
Supplemental Study 
Design 
Three hundred fifty-five U.S. participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
completed an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation (Mage=35.9, 
SD=12.7, 57.2% female). Participants rated the persuasiveness of a series of arguments 
about genetically modified food.  Participants were randomly assigned (with equal 
probability) to either complete a measure of moral absolutism regarding genetically 
modification before rating these arguments, or to complete the absolutism measure after 
	  
	   97 
rating the arguments.  All participants completed a series of demographic questions at the 
end of the survey.  
Measures 
 Moral Absolutism. My moral absolutism measure was adapted from Baron & 
Spranca (1997) and is described fully in the main text.  I used this measure to classify 
participants as supporters (194/337, or 57.6%), non-absolutist opponents (37/337, or 
11.0%), or absolutist opponents (106/337, or 31.5%).  Eighteen participants were 
excluded for inconsistent responses (i.e., they indicated the did not oppose GM but also 
would prohibit GM no matter the risks and benefits, as done in Chapter 1 and by Baron & 
Spranca, 1997). 
 Arguments. Participants were instructed to “rate the following arguments that 
people make about genetically modified food.”  Ten diverse arguments were presented in 
random order (one per page). Some arguments were based on welfare benefits to 
humanity (e.g., genetically modified food can help stop world hunger). Other arguments 
were based on assessments about risks and benefits to consumers (e.g., genetically 
modified foods look and taste better). Participants were asked to rate “How persuasive do 
you find this argument?” on a 7-point scale anchored by “Not at all persuasive” and 
“Extremely persuasive.” The exact text of each argument is listed below (italicized labels 
were not shown to participants): 
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Hunger. Genetically modified crops could help stop world hunger.  These crops 
can grow more units per square mile, which could be pivotal in an era where our 
population is outstripping our food production capacity. 
Blindness. Genetically modified foods could prevent millions of people from 
going blind.  For example, “golden rice” is a genetically modified form of rice 
with higher levels of vitamin A.  It has the potential to prevent blindness from 
vitamin A deficiency, which is widespread in Asia. 
Pesticides. GM crops actually reduce pesticide use, which could minimize 
environmental impacts.  
Risk. There is widespread consensus among scientists that consuming genetically 
modified food is no riskier than consuming food modified by conventional plant 
improvement techniques. 
Vitamins. GM foods could make it easier for consumers to get their vitamins. We 
now grow rice with more vitamin A, which could help people get enough Vitamin 
A and maintain a balanced diet. 
Profit 1. GM crops could increase profitability of farming.  These crops require 
fewer pesticides, which lowers cost of production. 
Profit 2. GM crops could increase profitability of farming. These crops can grow 
more units per square mile, which increases revenue. 
Allergens. There is no evidence that genetic modification would introduce new 
allergens (substances that cause allergic reactions). 
Freshness. Some GM foods can last longer in your refrigerator. 
Taste. Some GM foods look and taste better. 
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Demographics.  Participants indicated their gender, age, income bracket, education, 
sexual orientation, political orientation, religion, religiosity, and whether they grew up in 
a rural, urban, or suburban location. 
Results 
Effects of Arguments on Moral Absolutism. Seeing pro-genetically modified food 
arguments did not reliably change overall frequencies of supporters, non-absolutist 
opponents, and absolutist opponents, χ2(2, N = 337) = 2.79, p = .248 with Yates 
continuity correction (see Table A.7). In addition to the non-significant overall effect of 
seeing pro-GM arguments, there was also so change in the proportion of absolutist 
opponents (vs. the two other categories), χ2(1, N = 337) = 1.09, p = .297 with Yates 
continuity correction. Looking only at GM opponents, there was a directionally lower 
proportion of absolutist opponents after seeing pro-GM arguments (52/76, or 68.4%) as 
compared to before seeing arguments (54/67, or 8.6%), but this difference in proportions 
did not reach significance, χ2(1, N = 143) = 2.15, p = .142 with Yates continuity 
correction. These results are broadly consistent with previous research finding that 
providing information or arguments does not reduce opposition to genetically modified 
food (Scholderer & Frewer, 2003). 
Rated Persuasiveness of GM Arguments.  Figure A.2 displays average 
persuasiveness ratings of the ten arguments, for supporters, non-absolutist opponents, and 
absolutist opponents.  Unsurprisingly, supporters generally found the arguments most 
persuasive, absolutist opponents found the arguments least persuasive, and non-absolutist 
opponents fell somewhere in between. Absolutist opponents found none of the arguments 
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particularly persuasive; on average they rated every argument below the scale midpoint 
of four. 
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Table A.1. Participant locations. 
 
State Number of Participants  Percentage of Participants 
 Alabama 13 1.6% 
 Alaska 3 .4% 
 Arizona 12 1.4% 
 Arkansas 7 .8% 
 California 52 6.2% 
 Colorado 14 1.7% 
 Connecticut 14 1.7% 
 Delaware 2 .2% 
 District of Columbia 3 .4% 
 Florida 69 8.3% 
 Georgia 25 3.0% 
 Hawaii 2 .2% 
 Idaho 5 .6% 
 Illinois 27 3.2% 
 Indiana 36 4.3% 
 Iowa 6 .7% 
 Kansas 7 .8% 
 Kentucky 17 2.0% 
 Louisiana 6 .7% 
 Maine 8 1.0% 
 Maryland 11 1.3% 
 Massachusetts 23 2.8% 
 Michigan 31 3.7% 
 Minnesota 10 1.2% 
 Mississippi 4 .5% 
 Missouri 29 3.5% 
 Montana 3 .4% 
 Nebraska 9 1.1% 
 Nevada 9 1.1% 
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 New Hampshire 3 .4% 
 New Jersey 24 2.9% 
 New Mexico 4 .5% 
 New York 55 6.6% 
 North Carolina 33 3.9% 
 North Dakota 1 .1% 
 Ohio 49 5.9% 
 Oklahoma 11 1.3% 
 Oregon 17 2.0% 
 Pennsylvania 43 5.1% 
 Rhode Island 3 .4% 
 South Carolina 8 1.0% 
 South Dakota 2 .2% 
 Tennessee 15 1.8% 
 Texas 44 5.3% 
 Utah 9 1.1% 
 Vermont 2 .2% 
 Virginia 17 2.0% 
 Washington 10 1.2% 
 West Virginia 6 .7% 
 Wisconsin 20 2.4% 
 Wyoming 3 .4% 
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Table A.2. Relationship between state disgust at genetically modified food consumption 
and GM opposition. 
Independent 
Variable 
Non-Absolute Opposition 
(versus Absolute Opposition) 
Support (versus Absolute 
Opposition) 
 Coefficient Wald p Coefficient Wald p 
State disgust -.489 11.891 .001 -1.367 74.955 <.001 
Risks -.303 3.819 .051 -.970 39.284 <.001 
Benefits .131 1.027 .311 .501 11.367 .001 
Trust .049 .147 .702 .344 5.887 .015 
Connectedness 
to Nature -.408 7.566 .006 -.257 2.601 .107 
Inclusion of 
Nature in Self .303 4.526 .033 .280 3.694 .055 
Date of Birth .132 1.074 .300 -.054 .182 .669 
Education .107 .647 .421 -.113 .688 .407 
Political 
Orientation (7 
= most 
conservative) 
-.183 1.938 .164 -.031 .052 .820 
Income .107 .711 .399 .200 2.367 .124 
Religiosity .037 .088 .766 -.051 .158 .691 
Gender (1 = 
female) -.145 .330 .565 -.399 2.455 .117 
Ethnicity, 
White 1.421 1.201 .273 1.237 .885 .347 
Ethnicity, 
Black .727 .261 .609 .881 .386 .535 
Ethnicity, 
Hispanic 2.167 1.890 .169 -.446 .054 .817 
Ethnicity, East 
Asian .563 .171 .679 .768 .325 .569 
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Ethnicity, 
Native 
American 
.762 .381 .537 1.166 .840 .359 
Ethnicity, 
Southeast 
Asian 
2.119 1.540 .215 2.705 2.288 .130 
Note. A multinomial logistic regression model predicting absolute GM opposition 
(reference category), non-absolute opposition, and support with disgust reactions from 
scenarios for N = 621 participants is displayed.  All independent variables except gender 
and ethnicity are standardized. Participants who selected a political orientation outside of 
liberal-conservative spectrum (e.g., “don’t know”) or who indicated an age outside the 
range of 18 to 100 years old are excluded. 
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Table A.3. Relationship between trait disgust sensitivity and GM opposition. 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Non-Absolute Opposition (versus 
Absolute Opposition) 
Support (versus Absolute 
Opposition) 
 Coefficient Wald p Coefficient Wald p 
Disgust 
Sensitivity -.372 7.645 .006 -.602 2.562 <.001 
Risks -.406 7.202 .007 -1.266 75.618 <.001 
Benefits .169 1.792 .181 .679 23.940 <.001 
Trust .116 .786 .375 .450 11.343 <.001 
Connectedness 
to Nature -.461 9.628 .002 -.355 5.785 .016 
Inclusion of 
Nature in Self .262 3.368 .066 .182 1.832 .176 
Date of Birth .138 1.172 .279 -.084 .514 .473 
Education .150 1.292 .256 .055 .189 .664 
Political 
Orientation (7 
= most 
conservative) 
-.189 2.067 .151 .001 .000 .991 
Income .067 .283 .595 .096 .634 .426 
Religiosity .033 .073 .787 -.046 .144 .704 
Gender (1 = 
female) .044 .029 .864 -.033 .018 .893 
Ethnicity, 
White 2.042 2.299 .129 1.589 1.535 .215 
Ethnicity, 
Black 1.255 .738 .390 1.244 .835 .361 
Ethnicity, 
Hispanic 2.581 2.311 .128 .100 .003 .959 
Ethnicity, East 
Asian 1.207 .752 .386 1.198 .814 .367 
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Ethnicity, 
Native 
American 
.645 .285 .594 .869 .579 .447 
Ethnicity, 
Southeast 
Asian 
2.835 2.525 .112 2.637 2.310 .129 
Note. A multinomial logistic regression model predicting absolute GM opposition (reference 
category), non-absolute opposition, and support with trait disgust sensitivity for N = 621 
participants is displayed.  All independent variables except gender and ethnicity are standardized. 
Participants who selected a political orientation outside of liberal-conservative spectrum (e.g., 
“don’t know”) or who indicated an age outside the range of 18 to 100 years old are excluded. 
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Table A.4. Principal components analysis of risk, benefit, and trust items.  
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Risk Item 1 -.090 -.023 .885 
Risk Item 2 -.054 -.041 .907 
Risk Item 3 -.085 .023 .817 
Risk Item 4 -.060 -.036 .919 
Benefit Item 1 .123 .907 -.007 
Benefit Item 2 .121 .909 -.031 
Benefit Item 3 .141 .882 -.025 
Benefit Item 4 .110 .866 -.012 
Trust Item 1 .823 .141 .027 
Trust Item 2 .824 .076 -.150 
Trust Item 3 .805 .083 -.210 
Trust Item 4 .754 .077 -.007 
Trust Item 5 .825 .166 -.019 
Note. Results of principal components analysis with a varimax rotation for risk, benefit, 
and trust are shown. Items that load above .3 are in bold. 
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Table A.5. Correlation matrix. 
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Note. The correlation matrix among variables is displayed. ** indicates P < .01, * 
indicates P < .05   
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Table A.6. Variance-covariance matrix of the observed variables used in the path 
analysis. 
 DS-R 
(disgust 
sensitivity) 
GM 
scenarios 
disgust 
Risks Desire for 
regulation 
DS-R (disgust sensitivity) .47521    
GM scenarios disgust .530146 5.30065   
Risks .335472 1.95845 3.75147  
Preference for regulation .251053 1.47623 2.0683 3.1559 
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Table A.7. Levels of moral absolutism before exposure versus after exposure to 
arguments in favor of genetically modified food. 
 Supporter Non-Absolutist 
Opponent 
Absolutist Opponent 
Before Arguments 89 (57%) 13 (8%) 54 (35%) 
After Arguments 105 (58%) 24 (13%) 52 (29%) 
Note.  Each cell displays counts and percentages (by row). 
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Figure A.1. Path model showing relationships between disgust sensitivity, disgust at 
consumption of genetically modified food, GM risk perceptions, and desire to regulate 
GM. Unstandardized parameter estimates are displayed first; standardized estimates are 
in parentheses; 95% CIs of the unstandardized estimates are in brackets. 
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Figure A.2. Rated persuasiveness of ten arguments for supporters, non-absolutist 
opponents and absolutist opponents.  Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
 
ANALYSES OF PREVENT VS. CURE EFFECT IN EACH SCENARIO  
(STUDIES 2.1, 2.2B AND 2.3) 
 In studies 2.1, 2.2B and 2.3, participants viewed a number of scenarios.  In tables 
B.1 through B.3 I display the effect of prevent vs. cure manipulations broken down by 
scenario.  In table B.1, I display the effect of prevent vs. cure on the natural preference 
for each of the nine ailments in study 2.1.  In table B.2A, I display the effect of prevent 
vs. cure on the preferences for potent medicines for diseases of different severity in study 
2.2B.  In table B.2B, I display the effect of prevent vs. cure on tolerance of risks from 
medicines for diseases of different severity in study 2.2B.  In table B.3A, I display the 
effect of prevent vs. cure on the natural preference for each of the three ailments in study 
2.3, and in table B.3B I display the effect of prevent vs. cure on the relative importance of 
safety vs. potency for each of the three ailments in study 2.3. 
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ANALYSES OF PREVENT VS. CURE EFFECT USING ONLY FIRST 
SCENARIO PRESENTED (STUDIES 2.1 AND 2.2B) 
Study 2.1 
Due to the fact that participants viewed and made judgments across many similar 
scenarios, I also examined the effect of preventing vs. curing using only the first scenario 
that participants saw. I conducted two separate repeated measures ANOVAs—one on 
scenarios with medicines and one on scenarios with household products.  (I conduct 
separate ANOVAs because combining the data into one ANOVA would be inappropriate 
given the unequal cell sizes. Since half of participants saw a medicine scenario first and 
half saw a household product scenario first via random assignment, but there were three 
medicine scenarios and six household product scenarios, cells in the medicine scenario 
contain approximately twice as many observations.) 
Both ANOVAs revealed a significant effect of preventing vs. curing on natural 
preference.  In a 2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent, Cure) x 3 (Target Ailment: Vitamin B 
Deficiency, Scurvy, Common Cold) between-subjects ANOVA on ratings of preference 
for the natural medicine, participants preferred natural to a greater extent for preventing 
than for curing (F(1, 497) = 3.76, p = .053, ηp2 = .01). Natural preference varied across 
target medicines (F(2, 497) = 3.85, p = .022, ηp2 = .02), and there was no significant 
interaction between target ailment and treatment purpose (F(2, 497) = .031, p > .25). In a 
2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent, Cure) x 6 (Target Problem: Mold, Mouth Bacteria, Metal 
Stains, Wood Stains, Clothing Stains, Pipe Leaks) between-subjects ANOVA on ratings 
of preference for the natural products, participants preferred natural products more for 
preventing than for curing (F(1, 489) = 14.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .03). Natural preference 
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also varied across target problems (F(5, 489) = 9.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .16) and there was no 
interaction between target problem and treatment purpose (F(5, 489) = 1.59, p = .161).  
Study 2.2B 
Because Study 2.2B also contained many similar scenarios, I again analyze just 
the first scenario that a participant read. In a 2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent vs. Cure) X 3 
(Disease Severity: Low, Medium, High) between subjects ANOVA on potency 
preference, prevent vs. cure purpose reduced preferences for potency (F(1, 196) = 7.56, p 
= .007, ηp2  = .04). Additionally, participants preferred more potent treatments for more 
severe diseases (F(2, 196) = 74.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .43) and there was no disease severity 
by treatment purpose interaction (F(2, 196) = 1.75, p = .177).  
In a similar ANOVA but with risk tolerance as the dependent variable, prevent vs. 
cure purpose reduced risk tolerance (F(1, 196) = 1.30, p = .002, ηp2 = .05).  Additionally, 
participants tolerated more risk for more severe diseases (F(2, 196) = 68.41, p < .001, ηp2 
= .41) and there was no disease severity by treatment purpose interaction (F(2, 196) = 
.73, p = .477).  
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SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES 
 
STUDY B.1: OBSERVATIONAL STUDY USING LARGE, NATIONALLY 
REPRESENTATIVE DATASET 
I examined what consumers’ say about why they have used natural products in a large 
national survey about uses of alternative therapies. This survey fortuitously included a 
few items relevant for my predictions. 
The Survey 
I used a dataset from the National Health Interview Survey (CDC/NCHS, 
National Health Interview Survey 2012a, 2012b).  The NHIS is conducted annually on a 
nationally representative sample of the U.S. population by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), and the data are publicly available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhis/nhis_questionnaires.htm. The 2012 survey included a set 
of questions about the use of complementary and alternative medicines. 
Sample.  The NHIS sampled adults (N = 34,525) in the U.S. population. Each 
adult completed a set of questions about his or her healthcare, including the 
supplementary questions on complementary and alternative medicines.  In a few (N = 
468) cases, a knowledgeable proxy answered for the adult, who was mentally or 
physically unable to answer.  Additionally, some individuals (N = 931) opted out of or 
were unavailable to complete the complementary and alternative supplement.   
Interview Method.  Census interviewers collected NHIS data throughout the year 
through face-to-face interviews (though follow-ups to complete interviews may have 
been conducted via telephone). Interviews were computer-assisted. A computer program 
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presented the questionnaire to an interviewer and interviewers entered survey responses 
directly into the computer. Based on previous responses, the computer program 
automatically routed the interviewer to appropriate questions.    
Survey Questions.  
Overview. 
Respondents were first asked about whether or not they used eighteen different 
types of alternative treatment therapies in the past 12 months.  Of all participants, 28.9 % 
(N = 9, 972) had used at least one alternative treatment. These participants listed their top 
three alternative treatments, in order of importance.  Each participant answered a number 
of questions about their top three alternative therapies, including two measures of 
interest—whether preventing was a reason for usage (Yes or No) and whether natural 
preference was a reason for usage (Yes or No).  For exact question wording of these 
items, see bolded items in “Questions for Top Three Treatments Only” section below.  
Participants would first complete all questions about their most important alternative 
treatment, then cycle through these items for their second and third most important 
alternative treatment. Participants who did not have a second or third most important 
alternative treatment bypassed this section of questions.  
Questions for All Alternative Treatments. Participants were first asked about 18 
alternative treatments: acupuncture, aryuveda, biofeedback, chelation therapy, 
chiropractic or osteopathic manipulation, craniosacral therapy, energy healing therapy, 
hypnosis, massage, naturopathy, traditional healers, movement therapies 
(Pilates/Trager/psychophysical integration/Feldenkrais), herbal and non-vitamin 
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supplements, vitamins and minerals, homeopathy, special diets, yoga/tai chi/qi gong, and 
relaxation techniques (meditation/guided imagery/progressive relaxation).  
For each treatment, participants were asked about whether they had used the 
treatment ever and in the past year; how frequently they had seen a practitioner for the 
treatment, insurance coverage versus out-of-pocket payment for the treatment, and 
materials purchased to learn about the treatment.   
Questions for Top Three Treatments Only. After participants indicated the top 
three alternative treatments most important to their health, a number of questions were 
asked only about these three treatments. (For these treatments, the NHIS excluded 
Ayurveda, chelation therapy, and vitamins and minerals due to very low or high 
prevalence.)  For each of the top three treatments, participants completed the following 
measures.   
Participants were asked about five potential reasons for using the treatment.  For 
each reason, participants could respond “Yes” or “No” (though a small percentage of 
participants’ answers were coded as “Don’t Know”, “Refused” or “Not Ascertained”).  
These reasons included one of the measures relevant to my hypothesis, the preventing 
measure, which is bolded below. 
“Did you [use this therapy] for any of these reasons?” 
1. “For general wellness or general disease prevention?”  
2. “To improve your energy?” 
3. “To improve your immune function?” 
4. “To improve your athletic or sports performance?” 
5. “To improve your memory or concentration?” 
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 Then, participants were asked a number of questions about whether the treatment 
motivated them to engage in healthy behaviors (e.g., exercise more regularly) or led to 
positive outcomes (e.g., better sleep, reduced stress). Participants were also asked 
which—of the reasons, motivations, and outcomes—was the most important reason for 
using the alternative therapy, and how effective the therapy was with regards to that 
reason. Next, participants indicated whether they used the treatment for specific health 
problems and, if yes, what those health problems, which was the most important health 
problem, and what other conventional treatments they used for the most important health 
problem (e.g., prescription medication).   
 Participants were then asked further questions about why they used the alternative 
treatment therapy. (Five reasons, not listed below, were only asked of participants who 
were using the alternative therapy in addition other conventional treatment(s) for a 
specific health problem.) Four reasons were asked of all participants using an alternative 
therapy.  For each reason, participants could respond “Yes” or “No” (though a small 
percentage of participants’ answers were coded as “Don’t Know”, “Refused” or “Not 
Ascertained”). These reasons included one of the measures relevant to my hypothesis, the 
natural preference measure, which is bolded below. 
“Did you [use this therapy] for any of these reasons?” 
1. “It is natural?” 
2. “It focuses on the whole person, mind, body, and spirit?” 
3. “It treats the cause and not just the symptoms?” 
4. “It was part of your upbringing?”  
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Finally, a series of questions was asked about: whether the treatment had been 
recommended to them by someone (e.g., a medical doctor); whether they disclosed use of 
alternative therapy to a medical professional and, if not, why they chose not to disclose; 
and their sources of information about the treatment (e.g., the internet). More information 
about exact wording of questions is available at www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhis.htm.   
Results 
Bivariate Relationships between Treatment Purpose and Natural Preference. 
First, I examined the bivariate relationships between using a treatment because it 
was natural and using it for prevention. I conducted separate analyses for the most 
important treatment (N  = 9,972), the second most important treatment (N = 4,611), and 
the third most important treatment (N = 2,045). Because some participants only used one 
or two alternative treatments over the year, the number of participants decreases from the 
first to second and second to third most important treatments. I examine the percent of 
people who indicated they had used a treatment because it was natural. Consistent with 
my predictions, two-sample z-tests revealed that people are more likely to use a treatment 
because it was natural if they were using it for prevention (Most Important Treatment: 
Mpreventing = 65.3%, Mnot preventing = 39.8%, z = 24.5, p < .001; Second Most Important 
Treatment: Mpreventing = 72.4%, Mnot preventing = 45.2%, z = 17.1, p < .001; Third Most 
Important Treatment: Mpreventing = 77.4%, Mnot preventing = 59.5%, z = 7.8, p < .001). 
Additionally, there is a trend where the proportion of individuals preferring natural 
increases from first to second and second to third most important treatment. I expect this 
trend occurs because participants who more strongly prefer natural use more alternative 
medicines. 
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Robustness Checks. 
Because prevent vs. cure purpose was not experimentally manipulated, it is 
possible that some third variable (e.g., being female) causes both a preference for natural 
and tendency towards preventative treatment.  Therefore, I assessed whether this 
relationship was robust when assessing the effect of prevent vs. cure in a within-subjects 
comparison (where each individual is their own control) and in between subjects analysis 
including demographic control variables in the model. 
Within Subjects Model. 
 It is possible that some individual difference variable causes people to both prefer 
natural and use preventative treatments, and that this confound caused the relationships 
above. In order to control for this possible selection bias, I isolated the 1,717 individuals 
who had used at least one alternative for preventing and one alternative not for 
preventing. I conducted a within subjects comparison on these participants, thereby 
controlling for selection on unobservable individual differences. I compared two 
proportions: the percentage of times a person indicated they had used a medicine because 
it was natural when preventing versus the percentage of times that same person indicated 
they had used a medicine because it was natural when not preventing. A paired, two-
tailed Wilcoxon signed-ranks test indicated that consumers were more likely to say they 
had used a medicine because it was natural when they were using it for prevention 
(Mpreventing = 65.4%, SD = 45.5%; Mnot preventing = 53.1%, SD = 48.7%, V = 133483, p < 
.001).   
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 Binary Choice Models with Demographic Controls. 
As a further robustness check, I estimated the effect of treatment purpose on 
natural preference while controlling for demographic variables in a binary logistic 
regression. I entered whether or not a participant reported using a treatment because it 
was natural as the outcome variable, and entered as simultaneous predictors: whether the 
participant was using the treatment for prevention, region of residence in the U.S. (East, 
Midwest, West or South region), age, gender, ethnicity, and marital status.  
I conducted separate regressions for the most important treatment (N  = 9,972), 
the second most important treatment (N = 4,611), and the third most important treatment 
(N = 2,045). Because some participants only used one or two alternative treatments over 
the year, the number of participants decreases from the first to second and second to third 
most important treatments. In all three regressions, individuals who used a treatment for 
preventing were significantly more likely to use the treatment because it was natural 
(Most Important Treatment: b = 1.05, Wald z statistic = 24.02, p < .001, odds ratio = 
2.85; Second Most Important Treatment: b = 1.15, Wald z statistic = 16.64, p < .001, 
odds ratio = 3.17; Third Most Important Treatment: b = .85, Wald z statistic = 7.64, p < 
.001, odds ratio = 2.34).  (See Tables B.4-B.6 for more information.) The odds of using a 
treatment because it was natural was estimated to increase between 2.34 and 3.17 times if 
it was used for preventing. Additionally, for less important treatments (e.g., second or 
third treatment), the base rate of using a medicine because it was natural increased. I 
expect this is because individuals who use three alternative therapies in a year, as 
opposed to one, have a higher trait preference for natural products. 
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STUDY B.2A AND B.2B: WITHIN-SUBJECTS REPLICATIONS OF STUDY 2.1 
Studies B.2A and B.2B replicate the central finding from study 2.1, that there is a 
stronger preference for natural products when preventing than when curing. Both studies 
use a within-subjects manipulation of preventing versus curing (as opposed to the 
between-subjects manipulation in study 2.1). Study B.2A replicates this finding in the 
domain of medicines, and study B.2B replicates this finding for household products. 
Study B.2A 
 Study B.2A investigates whether there is a stronger preference for a natural 
medicine when the medicine is used as a preventative as opposed to a curative, using a 
within-subjects manipulation of preventing versus curing.  
Methods  
Participants. Two hundred and seven U.S. participants from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk completed an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation 
(Mage = 36.1, SD = 12.9, 36.2% female).  
Scenarios. The survey consisted of three different scenarios highlighting different 
target ailments. Each scenario described two cases: one for preventing and one for curing. 
The study thus consisted of a 2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent, Cure) x 3 (Target Ailment: 
Vitamin B Deficiency, Scurvy/Vitamin C Deficiency, Common Cold) within-subjects 
design. Vitamin B deficiency, scurvy, and common cold were chosen as ailments because 
individuals can use the same medicine to prevent and to cure these ailments. 
 The scenario about vitamin B deficiency read as follows: 
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Imagine the following two cases. In case A, you are susceptible to hypocobalaminemia, a 
vitamin B12 deficiency, and your doctor prescribes a preventative medicine, vitamin B12. 
In case B, you already have hypocobalaminemia, and your doctor prescribes the exact 
same medicine, vitamin B12, in the exact same dose. 
 
In both case A and case B, you will take vitamin B12 once a day for 3 weeks. 
 
Suppose there are synthetic forms of vitamin B12 (generated in a lab) and natural forms 
of vitamin B12 (extracted from soybean plants). 
 
 The scenarios for the other two ailments were similar; the synthetic medicine was 
“generated in a lab” and the natural medicine was extracted from a plant (allicin extracted 
from garlic for the cold and vitamin C extracted from oranges for scurvy). In all cases, 
preventing and curing illnesses involved medicines prescribed by doctors and taken in the 
same doses for the same amount of time. After each scenario, participants responded to 
two questions on scales ranging from 1 = strongly prefer synthetic, to 7 = strongly prefer 
natural, with a midpoint of 4 = indifferent. For example, participants answered the 
following two questions for the vitamin B scenario (emphasis in original): “For [case A, 
preventing hypocobalaminemia/case B, curing hypocobalaminemia], would you prefer 
the natural or the synthetic medicine?” Scenarios were presented in randomized order, 
and participants were randomly assigned to either see questions about preventing before 
questions about curing or vice versa.  
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Ancillary Measures. Participants also answered eight questions about how 
beneficial and risky different medicines were in general, on scales from 1 = not at all 
beneficial/risky, to 7 = very beneficial/risky. They answered these questions with respect 
to a) natural preventative medicines, b) natural curative medicines, c) synthetic 
preventative medicines, and d) synthetic curative medicines.  Thus, they answered eight 
questions (i.e., 2 (Consequence: Risk, Benefit) x 2 (Natural: Natural, Synthetic) x 2 
(Treatment Purpose: Prevent, Cure)) presented in randomized order.  Half of participants 
were randomly assigned to answer these questions before seeing the scenarios about 
preventing and curing specific illnesses, and half answered after the scenarios.  
Individual Differences and Demographics. Additionally, participants completed 
fifteen items about general tendencies to prefer natural products and completed 
demographic measures (gender, age, income, political orientation, ethnicity, whether they 
grew up in a rural, suburban, or urban neighborhood, religion, and religiosity).  
Results 
Scenarios. 
In a 2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent, Cure) x 3 (Target Ailment: Vitamin B 
Deficiency, Scurvy, Common Cold) repeated measures ANOVA on ratings of preference 
for the natural medicine, participants preferred natural to a greater extent for preventing 
than for curing (F(1, 206) = 44.97, P < .001, ηp2 = .18). Additionally, participants 
exhibited stronger natural preference for certain target ailments (F(2, 205) = 6.65, P = 
.002, ηp2  = .06) and there was no interaction between target ailment and treatment 
purpose (F(2, 205) = .70, P > .25).  
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In paired t-tests, preferences for natural medicines significantly increased when 
preventing versus curing each of the three diseases (all Ps < .001 and effect sizes ranged 
from d = .36 to d = .43; see Table B.7). However, it is worth noting that even when 
curing ailments, participants preferred the natural medicine, albeit more weakly than 
when preventing.  
The effect of treatment purpose (prevent versus cure) held when only examining 
the first scenario presented. Because each scenario involved a comparison between 
preventing and curing, that experimental manipulation remained within-subjects even 
when examining only the first scenario. In a 2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent, Cure) x 3 
(Target Ailment: Vitamin B Deficiency, Scurvy, Common Cold) mixed ANOVA on 
ratings of preference for the natural medicine, participants preferred natural to a greater 
extent for preventing than for curing (F(1, 204) = 29.10, p < .001, ηp2  = .13). Natural 
preference did not significantly vary across target ailments (F(2, 204) = 1.71, p = .18).  
There was an unpredicted significant interaction between target ailment and treatment 
purpose (F(2, 204) = 3.13, p = .046, ηp2  = .03).  In follow-up t-tests, the effect of 
treatment purpose was largest for scurvy (Scurvy:  MPrevent = 5.82, S.D. = 1.21, MCure = 
4.99, S.D. = 1.65, t(70) = 4.88, p < .001, d = .60; Cold:  MPrevent = 5.28, S.D. = 1.52, MCure 
= 4.82, S.D. = 1.60, t(60) = 2.73, p = .008, d = .35; Vitamin B Deficiency:  MPrevent = 
5.57, S.D. = 1.33, MCure = 5.31, S.D. = 1.62, t(74) = 1.68, p = .098, d = .19). 
Ancillary Measures. 
Natural medicines were, in general, perceived to be less risky when curing 
(Mnatural  = 3.10, SD = 1.54 vs. Msynthetic  = 4.34, SD = 1.36, t(206) = 9.17, p < .001, d = 
1.27 ) and when preventing (Mnatural  = 3.06, SD = 1.49 vs. Msynthetic  = 4.14, SD = 1.36, 
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t(206) = 8.18, p < .001, d = 1.14). Natural medicines were perceived to be marginally less 
beneficial when curing diseases (Mnatural  = 4.86, SD = 1.56 vs. Msynthetic  = 5.08, SD = 
1.20, t(206) =  1.73, p = .086, d = .24).  Perceived benefits of natural and synthetic 
medicines did not reliably differ when preventing diseases (Mnatural  = 5.01, SD = 1.45 vs. 
Msynthetic  = 4.81, SD = 1.19, t(206) =  1.64, P = .103).   
Study B.2B  
Study B.2B is very similar to Study B.2A except that it looks at household 
problems and products rather than medical ones.  
Methods 
Two hundred two U.S. participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk completed 
an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation (Mage = 36.5, SD = 14.0, 6.4% 
female).  
The survey consisted of six different scenarios about household products. Each 
scenario described one case for preventing a target problem and one case for fixing that 
target problem. Thus, the study consisted of a 2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent, Cure) x 6 
(Target Problem: Mold, Mouth Bacteria, Metal Stains, Wood Stains, Clothing Stains, 
Pipe Leaks) within-subjects design. The study followed the exact same procedures as 
study B.2A, except that ancillary risk/benefit measures were excluded. For example, the 
scenario for household mold was as follows.  
  
Imagine the following two cases. In case A, you are preventing mold from growing in 
your home. In case B, you are removing mold that is already growing in your home. 
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In both case A and case B, you plan to use an anti-mold solution. Suppose there are 
synthetic forms of anti-mold solution and natural forms of anti-mold solution. 
 
After each scenario, participants were presented with questions about preferring 
natural products (adapted from study B.2A). In addition, participants completed the same 
trait natural preference measures and demographic measures from study B.2A.  
Results 
In a 2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent, Cure) x 6 (Target Problem: Mold, Mouth 
Bacteria, Metal Stains, Wood Stains, Clothing Stains, Pipe Leaks) repeated measures 
ANOVA on ratings of preference for the natural products, participants preferred natural 
products more for preventing than for curing (F(1,201) = 13.85, p < .001, ηp2  = .06). 
Natural preference also varied across target problems (F(5,197) = 2.54, p < .001, ηp2  = 
.34) and there was an unpredicted interaction between target problem and treatment 
purpose (F(5,197) = 12.77, p < .001, ηp2  =.25).  
Paired t-tests revealed that natural was preferred significantly more when 
preventing as opposed to curing for four of the six target problems—mold, mouth 
bacteria, metal stains, and clothing stains. Effects for wood stains and pipe leaks were not 
significant, but were directionally consistent (see Table B.8; effect sizes range from d = 
.07 to d = .45, with average effect of d = .23).  Additionally, as in study B.2A, for most 
target problems (except pipe leaks), the natural product was preferred even when curing 
the problem, albeit more weakly than when preventing that problem.  
The effect of treatment purpose (prevent versus cure) holds when only examining 
the first scenario presented. As in study B.2A, because each scenario involved a 
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comparison between preventing and curing, that experimental manipulation remained 
within-subjects even when examining only the first scenario.  In a 2 (Treatment Purpose: 
Prevent, Cure) x 6 (Target Problem: Mold, Mouth Bacteria, Metal Stains, Wood Stains, 
Clothing Stains, Pipe Leaks) mixed ANOVA, participants preferred natural products to a 
greater extent for preventing than for curing (F(1, 196) = 5.430, p = .021, ηp2  = .027). 
Natural preference also varied across target problems (F(5,196) = 3.73, p = .003, ηp2  = 
.09) and there was no interaction between target problem and treatment purpose 
(F(5,196) = 2.72, p = .088).   
STUDY B.3: MEDIATION MODEL WITH SAFETY AND POTENCY AS TWO 
SEPARATE PATHWAYS 
Study B.3 serves two purposes.  First, it further examines the mechanism of 
relative importance of safety and potency.  It is similar to study 2.3. However in study 
2.3, I cannot know whether relative importance of safety and potency shifts because 
safety becomes more important and potency’s importance stays the same, potency 
becomes less important and safety’s importance stays the same, or each attribute’s 
importance changes. In this study, I estimate absolute importance of safety and potency 
as two indirect pathways in a mediation model. I show preventing increases natural 
preference because it both increases the importance of safety and decreases the 
importance of potency. Second, I use all nine treatments and problems from study 2.1, 
and show that the mediation model holds for both medicines and household products.    
Method 
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Four hundred two U.S. participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk completed 
an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation (Mage = 37.8, SD = 11.6, 54.0% 
female).  
As in study 2.3, each participant viewed one scenario, and in each scenario 
participants considered a case where they were preventing a target problem and a case 
where they were curing the same target problem.  Through random assignment, 
participants saw one of the nine target problems from study 2.1 (vitamin B deficiency, 
scurvy, common cold, mold, mouth bacteria, metal stains, wood stains, clothing stains, 
pipe leaks).  Scenarios were identical to study 2.3. 
Participants indicated their preferences for the natural alternative when preventing 
and when curing the target problem (as in study 2.3).  In addition, they completed four 
measures of attribute importance: potency when preventing, safety when preventing, 
potency when curing, and safety when curing.  Scales ranged from 1 = not at all to 7 = 
extremely.  Before completing attribute importance measures, participants were told that:  
 
We are interested in how important the potency and the safety of the medicine are 
to you.  Potency refers to how strong and powerful the medicine is. Safety refers 
to the degree of risk and the extent of side effects that the medicine might entail.”   
 
Through random assignment, half of participants completed importance questions 
before preference questions and half completed them after preference questions. 
Furthermore, through random assignment, half of participants considered curing before 
preventing and half considered preventing before curing.  Finally, through random 
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assignment, half of participants indicated the importance of potency before indicating the 
importance of safety and half considered safety before potency. In addition, participants 
completed the same trait natural preference measures and demographic measures from 
study B.2A. 
Results 
There were no main effects or interactions with order of questions, except a small 
mediator order by scenario interaction on natural preference (p = .017) and a small 
mediator order by attribute order interaction on potency importance (p = .020), so I 
collapse across order. 
First, I examined preferences for natural products.  In a 2 (Treatment Purpose: 
Prevent, Cure) X 9 (Target Problem: Vitamin B Deficiency, Scurvy, Common Cold, 
Mold, Mouth Bacteria, Metal Stains, Wood Stains, Clothing Stains, Pipe Leaks) mixed 
ANOVA, natural options were more strongly preferred for preventing than for curing 
(F(1, 393) = 36.81, p < .001, ηp2  = .09).  Additionally, the natural alternative was 
preferred more strongly for some problems (F(8, 393) = 3.16, p = .002, ηp2  = .06).  There 
was no interaction between treatment purpose and target problem (F(8, 393) = 1.18, p > 
.25).  The effect of treatment purpose for each target problem is displayed in Table B.9A. 
Next, I examined the importance of potency. In a 2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent, 
Cure) X 9 (Target Problem: Vitamin B Deficiency, Scurvy, Common Cold, Mold, Mouth 
Bacteria, Metal Stains, Wood Stains, Clothing Stains, Pipe Leaks) mixed ANOVA on 
potency’s importance, potency was rated as less important when preventing (F(1, 393) = 
7.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .15).  Potency was considered more important for some target 
problems than for others (F(8, 393) = 5.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .09). Preventing always 
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decreased the importance of potency, but the magnitude of this effect varied across target 
problems (F(8, 393) = 2.29, p = .021, ηp2 = .05; see Table B.9B). 
Finally, I examined the importance of safety.  In a 2 (Treatment Purpose: Prevent, 
Cure) X 9 (Target Problem: Vitamin B Deficiency, Scurvy, Common Cold, Mold, Mouth 
Bacteria, Metal Stains, Wood Stains, Clothing Stains, Pipe Leaks) mixed ANOVA on 
safety’s importance, safety was rated as more important when preventing (F(1, 393) = 
2.18, p < .001, ηp2  = .05).  Safety was marginally more important for certain types of 
problems (F(8, 393) = 1.75, p = .086, ηp2  = .03). The effect of preventing on safety’s 
importance varied across target problems (F(8, 393) = 2.37, p = .017, ηp2  = .03; see Table 
B.9C). 
In a (within-subjects) mediation analysis, I assessed the indirect effect of 
treatment purpose on preference for natural medicine through two pathways: importance 
of potency and importance of safety. Because my experimental design was within-
subjects, I used MEMORE in SPSS (Montoya and Hayes 2017). This analysis revealed 
significant indirect effects of the importance of potency (indirect effect = .15, 95% CI 
[.09, .23]) and the importance of safety (indirect effect = .07, 95% CI [.03, .12]). 
Preventing (versus curing) an ailment reduced the importance of potency (apotency = -.45), 
and reducing the importance of potency increased the natural preference (bpotency = -.34). 
Preventing (versus curing) an ailment increased the importance of safety (asafety = .18), 
and increasing the importance of safety increased the natural preference (bsafety = .29). 
The importance of safety and potency accounted for 53% of the effect of preventing on 
natural preference (c = .42, p < .001; c’ = .20, p = .006).   A mediation model using only 
household product scenarios yielded very similar estimates (indirect effect of potency = 
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.15, 95% CI [.07, .23]; indirect effect of safety = .13, 95% CI [.07, .22]; c = .51, p < .001, 
c’ = .23, p = .011, 55% of total effect accounted for by indirect effects of safety and 
potency importance).  
STUDY B.4: REGULATORY FOCUS AND THE PREFERENCE FOR NATURAL 
 In study B.4, I examined the relationship between regulatory focus and the 
preference for natural.   
Methods 
 Two hundred three participants from Amazon’s Mechanical turk completed a 
survey in exchange for monetary compensation (Mage = 37.8, SD = 11.6; 49.8% female).  
Participants completed two measures in randomized order: the Regulatory Focus 
Questionnaire (Higgins et al. 2001) and a trait natural preference scale. After completing 
these two measures, participants completed demographic questions from study 2.1. 
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire. The Regulatory Focus Questionnaire is one of the most 
widely used measures of chronic or trait regulatory focus. (The paper describing the scale 
-- Higgins et al. 2001 -- is cited over 1000 times on Google Scholar. It is also 
recommended on Tory Higgins’s website as a measure of chronic regulatory focus.)  It 
consists of eleven items. Some items measure a history of success with prevention focus-
related vigilance, such as “How often did you obey rules and regulations that were 
established by your parents?” (on 5 point likert scale from never/seldom to very often).  
Others items measure a history of success with promotion focus-related eagerness such as 
“I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in my life” (on 5 point likert 
scale from certainly false to certainly true).  
Trait Natural Preference. Participants completed the following questions:  
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Participants answered an “inclusion of nature in self” item (Schultz, 2001). For 
this item, participants saw a series of seven pairs of circles, which progressed from barely 
touching to almost completely overlapping.  The left circle was labeled “Self” and the 
right labeled “Nature”, and participants were instructed to “select the picture that best 
describes your relationship with nature.” 
Participants indicated preferences for natural products by answering the five 
below items on a scale of 1 = less likely to buy it, 2 = indifferent, 3 = more likely to buy 
it. 
Likely Buy Food Organic. If a food is labeled as organic, I am... 
Likely Buy Food. If a food is labeled as natural, I am... 
Likely Buy Medicine. If a medicine is labeled as natural, I am... 
Likely Buy Cleaning Product. If a household cleaning product is labeled as 
natural, I am... 
Likely Buy Body Product. If a body product is labeled as natural, I am... 
Participants indicated ideational preference for natural products by answering the 
four below items on a scale of 1 = prefer the man-made product, 2 = indifferent, 3 = 
prefer the natural product.  These items were adapted from Rozin et al. (2004). 
ChemID Food. If a natural and a man-made food were chemically identical, I 
would... 
ChemID Medicine. If a natural and a man-made medicine were chemically 
identical, I would... 
ChemID Cleaning Product. If a natural and a man-made household cleaning 
product were chemically identical, I would... 
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ChemID Body Product. If a natural and a man-made body product were 
chemically identical, I would... 
Participants indicated their purchasing behaviors by answering the four below 
items on a scale of 1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = usually, 5 = always. 
Purchase Food Organic. I buy organic foods. 
Purchase Food. I buy natural foods. 
Purchase Medicine. I buy natural medicines. 
Purchase Cleaning Product. I buy natural household cleaning products. 
Purchase Body Product. I buy natural body products. 
Results 
 There were no significant effects of which scale was presented first (ps > .77) so I 
collapse across order. Predominant regulatory focus was computed by calculating the 
difference between the mean of promotion focus items and prevention focus items, where 
higher scores indicate a predominant promotion focus and lower scores indicate a 
predominant prevention focus. Trait natural preference was represented by a regression 
factor score from a one factor principal components analysis on the 13 items.  There was 
no reliable correlation between trait natural preference and predominant regulatory focus 
(r = .095 (t(201) = 1.35, p = .178).  In addition, I examined the promotion and prevention 
focus subscales independently.  Promotion focus was positively correlated with the 
natural preference (r = .258, t(201) = 3.79, p < .001), but prevention focus was 
directionally positively correlated with natural preference as well (r = .075, t(201) = 1.07, 
p = .288). 
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Table B.1. Effect of prevent vs. cure treatment purpose on preference for natural product for each 
ailment in study 2.1. 
 
Mean 
Natural 
Preference 
when 
Preventing 
(SD) 
Mean 
Natural 
Preference 
when Curing 
(SD) N T Value P Value Cohen's D 
Vitamin B 
Deficiency 5.93 (1.34) 5.60 (1.55) 1,004 3.56 < .001 .23 
Scurvy 6.14 (1.14) 5.89 (1.38) 1,004 3.17 .002 .20 
Common 
Cold 5.84 (1.44) 5.41 (1.66) 1,004 4.35 < .001 .28 
Mold 5.38 (1.76) 4.75 (1.98) 1,004 5.26 < .001 .34 
Mouth 
Bacteria 5.71 (1.54) 5.23 (1.77) 1,004 4.65 < .001 .29 
Metal Stains 5.25 (1.72) 4.72 (1.81) 1,004 4.75 < .001 .30 
Wood Stains 5.55 (1.55) 5.19 (1.65) 1,004 3.55 < .001 .23 
Clothing 
Stains 5.43 (1.61) 4.89 (1.84) 1,004 4.98 < .001 .32 
Pipe Leaks 4.72 (1.93) 4.18 (1.95) 1,004 4.35 < .001 .27 
Note. Unpaired t-tests on preference for natural product from 1 = strongly prefer synthetic to 7 = 
strongly prefer natural. 
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Table B.2A. Effect of prevent vs. cure treatment purpose on preferences for potent treatment for 
each scenario in study 2.2B. 
Scenario 
Mean 
Potency 
Preference 
when 
Preventing 
(SD) 
Mean 
Potency 
Preference 
when 
Curing (SD) N T Value P Value Cohens D 
Disease of 
Low 
Severity 
3.26 (1.61) 3.59 (1.68) 202 3.64 <.001 .26 
Disease of 
Medium 
Severity 
4.93 (1.29) 5.23 (1.17) 202 3.77 <.001 .28 
Disease of 
High 
Severity 
6.01 (1.14) 6.31 (.90) 202 4.54 <.001 .34 
Note. Paired t-tests on preferences for a potent treatment (7 point likert scales). 
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Table B.2B. Effect of prevent vs. cure treatment purpose on tolerance of risks from treatment for 
each scenario in study 2.2B. 
Scenario 
Mean Risk 
Tolerance 
when 
Preventing 
(SD) 
Mean Risk 
Tolerance 
when 
Curing (SD) N T Value P Value Cohens D 
Disease of 
Low 
Severity 
2.41 (1.33) 2.65 (1.48) 202 2.93 .004 .21 
Disease of 
Medium 
Severity 
4.10 (1.31) 4.46 (1.24) 202 4.63 <.001 .34 
Disease of 
High 
Severity 
5.15 (1.38) 5.59 (1.24) 202 5.27 <.001 .39 
Note. Paired t-tests on tolerance of risk in a treatment (7 point likert scales). 
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Table B.3A. Effect of prevent vs. cure treatment purpose on preference for natural product for 
each ailment in study 2.3. 
 
Mean Natural 
Preference 
when 
Preventing 
(SD) 
Mean 
Natural 
Preference 
when Curing 
(SD) 
N T Value P Value Effect Size 
Vitamin B 
Deficiency 5.32 (1.42) 5.13 (1.56) 68 1.4 .165 .17 
Scurvy 6.00 (1.23) 5.60 (1.53) 67 2.68 .009 .33 
Common 
Cold 5.24 (1.53) 4.73 (1.84) 70 2.86 .006 .38 
Note. Paired t-tests on preference for natural product from 1 = strongly prefer synthetic to 7 = 
strongly prefer natural. 
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Table B.3B. Effect of prevent vs. cure treatment purpose on relative importance of safety vs. 
potency for each ailment in study 2.3. 
 Mean Relative 
Importance 
when 
Preventing 
(SD) 
Mean 
Relative 
Importance 
when Curing 
(SD) 
N T Value P Value Effect 
Size 
Vitamin B 
Deficiency 
6.44 (16.97) 51.38 (18.65) 68 5.48 <.001 .67 
Scurvy 62.31 (14.65) 48.25 (18.44) 67 7.32 <.001 .92 
Common 
Cold 
64.99 (18.35) 53.14 (2.26) 70 5.76 <.001 .73 
Note. Paired t-tests on importance of safety versus potency (constant sum scale, where 100 = 
safety is only important feature and potency not at all important and 0 = potency is only important 
feature and safety is not at all important). 
 
	  
	   144 
Table B.4. Results for most important treatment in study B.1. 
 Estimate Std. Error Z value P  
Intercept -.444 .105 -4.226 <.001 
Preventing 1.049 .044 24.022 < .001 
Midwest Region -.212 .068 -3.138 .002 
South Region .115 .066 1.754 .079 
West Region .097 .064 1.516 .130 
Age -.003 .002 -1.801 .072 
Female .104 .044 2.379 .017 
African American .251 .077 3.262 .001 
AIAN .091 .226 .4 .689 
Asian .438 .087 5.017 .000 
Race not released .064 .473 .136 .892 
Multiple Race .097 .134 .728 .466 
Married, spouse not in 
household .062 .179 .344 .730 
Widowed -.160 .088 -1.816 .069 
Divorced .196 .063 3.091 .002 
Separated .080 .142 .561 .575 
Never married .024 .059 .404 .686 
Living with partner .047 .093 .509 .610 
Unknown marital status -1.085 .479 -2.263 .024 
Note. Binomial logistic regression predicting whether a treatment was used because it was 
natural, for the most important treatment (N = 9,972). Data Source: CDC/NCHS, National Health 
Interview Survey 2012a. 
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Table B.5. Results for second most important treatment in study B.1. 
 Estimate Std. Error Z value P  
Intercept -.106 .165 -.641 .521 
Preventing 1.155 .069 16.637 <.001 
Midwest Region -.313 .106 -2.947 .003 
South Region -.133 .105 -1.262 .207 
West Region -.104 .099 -1.047 .295 
Age -.002 .002 -.71 .478 
Female .126 .068 1.846 .065 
African American .244 .128 1.899 .058 
AIAN .020 .318 .061 .951 
Asian .250 .140 1.787 .074 
Race not released .365 1.122 .326 .745 
Multiple Race .062 .193 .319 .750 
Married, spouse not in 
household .134 .272 .495 .621 
Widowed -.034 .139 -.242 .809 
Divorced .176 .094 1.867 .062 
Separated .128 .241 .529 .597 
Never married -.029 .089 -.323 .747 
Living with partner -.034 .145 -.234 .815 
Unknown marital status -2.168 1.138 -1.906 .057 
Note. Binomial logistic regression predicting whether a treatment was used because it was 
natural, for the second most important treatment (N = 4,611). Data Source: CDC/NCHS, National 
Health Interview Survey 2012a. 
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Table B.6. Results for third most important treatment in study B.1. 
 Estimate Std. Error Z value P  
Intercept .347 .268 1.296 .195 
Preventing .851 .111 7.642 <.001 
Midwest Region -.071 .172 -.416 .677 
South Region -.143 .167 -.861 .389 
West Region .080 .154 .518 .605 
Age -.002 .004 -.549 .583 
Female .107 .111 .967 .334 
African American -.087 .204 -.425 .671 
AIAN -.431 .452 -.954 .340 
Asian .287 .244 1.175 .240 
Race not released 12.196 377.633 .032 .974 
Multiple Race .042 .287 .145 .884 
Married, spouse not in 
household -.091 .410 -.223 .823 
Widowed -.064 .229 -.279 .780 
Divorced .240 .150 1.602 .109 
Separated .408 .410 .997 .319 
Never married .110 .138 .796 .426 
Living with partner .091 .229 .398 .690 
Unknown marital status -1.081 1.419 -.762 .446 
Note. Binomial logistic regression predicting whether a treatment was used because it was 
natural, for the third most important treatment (N = 2,045). Data Source: CDC/NCHS, National 
Health Interview Survey 2012a.  
	  
	   147 
Table B.7. Effect of prevent vs. cure treatment purpose for each ailment in study B.2A. 
 Mean 
Natural 
Preference 
when 
Preventing 
(SD) 
Mean 
Natural 
Preference 
when 
Curing 
(SD) 
N T Value P Value Cohen's D 
Vitamin B 
Deficiency 
5.51 (1.43) 5.04 (1.75) 207 5.09 <.001 .36 
Scurvy 5.71 (1.32) 5.15 (1.73) 207 5.82 <.001 .43 
Common 
Cold 
5.45 (1.52) 4.91 (1.68) 207 5.73 <.001 .40 
Note. Paired t-tests on preference for natural product from 1 = strongly prefer synthetic to 7 = 
strongly prefer natural. 
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Table B.8. Effect of prevent vs. cure treatment purpose for each ailment in study B.2B. 
 Mean 
Natural 
Preference 
when 
Preventing 
(SD) 
Mean 
Natural 
Preference 
when 
Curing 
(SD) 
N T Value P Value Cohen's D 
Mold 5.22 (1.75) 4.41 (2.08) 202 6.30 <.001 .45 
Mouth 
Bacteria 
5.52 (1.60) 5.12 (1.81) 202 3.64 <.001 .25 
Metal 
Stains 
5.06 (1.69) 4.83 (1.73) 202 2.40 .017 .17 
Wood 
Stains 
5.25 (1.57) 5.09 (1.61) 202 1.59 .113 .12 
Clothing 
Stains 
5.24 (1.63) 4.92 (1.79) 202 3.32 .001 .26 
Pipe Leaks 4.22 (1.94) 4.14 (1.95) 202 .94 .347 .07 
Note. Paired t-tests on preference for natural product from 1 = strongly prefer synthetic to 7 = 
strongly prefer natural. 
	  
	   149 
Table B.9A. Effect of prevent vs. cure treatment purpose on preference for natural product for 
each ailment in study B.3. 
 Mean 
Natural 
Preference 
when 
Preventing 
(SD) 
Mean 
Natural 
Preference 
when 
Curing 
(SD) 
N T Value P Value Cohen's D 
Vitamin B 
Deficiency 5.60 (1.47) 5.47 (1.61) 43 .83 .412 .12 
Scurvy 5.67 (1.41) 5.53 (1.69) 45 .8 .429 .14 
Common 
Cold 5.46 (1.47) 5.02 (1.76) 46 2.38 .022 .36 
Mold 5.46 (1.80) 4.74 (1.93) 46 3.07 .004 .45 
Mouth 
Bacteria 5.44 (1.37) 5.09 (1.59) 45 2.33 .025 .35 
Metal 
Stains 5.36 (1.61) 4.71 (1.83) 42 2.4 .021 .40 
Wood 
Stains 5.96 (1.01) 5.54 (1.52) 46 2.06 .045 .33 
Clothing 
Stains 5.58 (1.26) 4.86 (1.79) 43 3.02 .004 .48 
Pipe Leaks 4.57 (1.85) 4.30 (1.92) 46 1.05 .300 .16 
Note. Paired t-tests on preference for natural product from 1 = strongly prefer synthetic to 7 = 
strongly prefer natural. 
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Table B.9B. Effect of prevent vs. cure treatment purpose on importance of potency for each 
ailment in study B.3. 
 Mean 
Potency 
Importance 
when 
Preventing 
(SD) 
Mean 
Potency 
Importance 
when 
Curing 
(SD) 
N T Value P Value Cohen's D 
Vitamin B 
Deficiency 5.44 (1.49) 5.88 (1.28) 43 -2.69 .01 -.42 
Scurvy 5.96 (1.04) 6.36 (.80) 45 -3.11 .003 -.42 
Common 
Cold 5.39 (1.22) 6.13 (.93) 46 -4.05 <.001 -.61 
Mold 6.09 (1.01) 6.59 (.72) 46 -3.72 .001 -.57 
Mouth 
Bacteria 5.82 (.96) 5.91 (.97) 45 -.68 .499 -.10 
Metal 
Stains 5.36 (1.34) 5.83 (1.12) 42 -2.18 .035 -.31 
Wood 
Stains 5.91 (1.15) 6.09 (.99) 46 -1.16 .253 -.18 
Clothing 
Stains 5.07 (1.50) 5.93 (1.08) 43 -4.11 <.001 -.65 
Pipe Leaks 6.17 (.90) 6.54 (.69) 46 -3.96 .001 -.50 
Note. Paired t-tests on preference on importance of potency from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely. 
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Table B.9C. Effect of prevent vs. cure treatment purpose on importance of safety for each 
ailment in study B.3. 
 Mean 
Safety 
Importance 
when 
Preventing 
(SD) 
Mean 
Safety 
Importance 
when 
Curing 
(SD) 
N T Value P Value Cohen's D 
Vitamin B 
Deficiency 
6.26 
(1.347) 
6.26 
(1.293) 
43 0 1 0 
Scurvy 6.38 
(1.007) 
6.38 (.834) 45 0 1 0 
Common 
Cold 
6.52 (.836) 6.41 (.979) 46 .96 .341 .14 
Mold 6.46 (.912) 6 (1.095) 46 3.71 .001 .56 
Mouth 
Bacteria 
6.31 (.9) 6.18 
(1.051) 
45 1.18 .244 .18 
Metal 
Stains 
6.19 (.969) 5.74 
(1.231) 
42 2.5 .017 .44 
Wood 
Stains 
6.43 
(1.047) 
6.07 
(1.405) 
46 3.14 .003 .50 
Clothing 
Stains 
6 (1.215) 5.88 
(1.238) 
43 1.09 .28 .17 
Pipe Leaks 5.85 (1.52) 5.83 (1.48) 46 .18 .855 .02 
Note. Paired t-tests on preference on importance of safety from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely. 
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